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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE: 
Utah Code Annotated § 17-12-44 (1992) states: 
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the 
principal or interest shall have been paid, or an 
acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, 
or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an 
action may be brought within the period prescribed for 
the same after such payment, acknowledgment or promise; 
but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, 
signed by the party to be charged thereby. When a right 
of action is barred by the provisions of any statute, it 
shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or 
ground of defense. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Respondent concurs with Appellants' jurisdictional statement. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court correctly rule that certain of the 
claims in the Defendants' Counterclaim were barred by the statute 
of limitations? In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the 
standard of review is that the appellate court accord no deference 
to the trial court's ruling and review it for correctness. 
Buchanan v. Hansen, 820 P.2d 908, 908 (Utah 1991). The appellate 
court is to apply the same standard as that applied by the trial 
court. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977). 
2. Did the trial court correctly rule that the Defendants had 
failed to state a claim, as a matter of law, as to certain other 
claims in their Counterclaim? In reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, the standard of review is that the appellate court accord 
no deference to the trial court's ruling and review it for 
correctness. Buchanan v. Hansen, 820 P.2d 908, 908 (Utah 1991). 
The appellate court is to apply the same standard as that applied 
by the trial court. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 
1977) . 
3. In the event this Court should find that the trial court 
erred in its ruling that certain of the Defendants' claims were 
barred by the statute of limitations, should the dismissal still be 
upheld because the Defendants have failed to make their case as a 
matter of law? In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the 
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standard of review is that the appellate court accord no deference 
to the trial court's ruling and review it for correctness. 
Buchanan v. Hansen, 820 P.2d 908, 908 (Utah 1991). The appellate 
court is to apply the same standard as that applied by the trial 
court. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977). 
4. Did the trial court correctly rule that certain of the 
claims in the Defendants' affirmative defenses were barred by the 
statute of limitations? In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
the standard of review is that the appellate court accord no 
deference to the trial court's ruling and review it for 
correctness. Buchanan v. Hansen, 820 P.2d 908, 908 (Utah 1991). 
The appellate court is to apply the same standard as that applied 
by the trial court. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 
1977) . 
5. Did the trial court correctly rule that the Defendants had 
failed to state a claim, as a matter of law, as to certain other 
claims in their affirmative defenses? In reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, the standard of review is that the appellate 
court accord no deference to the trial court's ruling and review it 
for correctness. Buchanan v. Hansen, 820 P. 2d 908, 908 (Utah 
1991). The appellate court is to apply the same standard as that 
applied by the trial court. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P. 2d 1332, 
1334 (Utah 1977) . 
6. In the event this Court should find that the trial court 
erred in its ruling that certain of the Defendants' affirmative 
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defenses were barred by the statute of limitations, should the 
dismissal still be upheld because the Defendants have failed to 
make their case as a matter of law? In reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, the standard of review is that the appellate 
court accord no deference to the trial court's ruling and review it 
for correctness. Buchanan v. Hansen, 820 P.2d 908, 908 (Utah 
1991). The appellate court is to apply the same standard as that 
applied by the trial court. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P. 2d 1332, 
1334 (Utah 1977). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case and Course of Proceeding 
This case involves a series of claims between State Bank of 
Southern Utah, a Utah banking corporation ("State Bank"), and Troy 
Hygro Systems, Inc. ("Troy Hygro"), and its principals, who are 
State Bank's borrowers. Troy Hygro and its principals, who were 
the Defendants at the trial court, will be referred to herein 
collectively as "Borrowers" or "Defendants." State Bank provided 
funding for Troy Hygro's business operation consisting of 
greenhouse grown tomatoes in New Castle, Utah. The Troy Hygro 
business in Utah has failed, and Troy Hygro now attempts to blame 
all of its woes on State Bank. 
There are three separate loans in issue. The Borrowers allege 
six separate counterclaims, and four separate affirmative defenses, 
some of which apply to more than one loan. And, because the loans 
were given at different times and under different circumstances, 
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the issues in relation to each vary. The trial court carefully and 
meticulously considered each claim, as applied separate 
loan, and entered its rulings. This Court must do likewise. 
The three loans are: a loan made on October 7, 1985, in the 
amounI: c>f $325,000; a loan made on February 10, 1987, in the amount 
of $60,000; and a loan made on November 7, 1988, in the amount of 
$49,000. The three loans were all to the same parties and were 
secured by the same collateral. The loans went into default, and 
on December 13, 1990, State Bank filed its Complaint to collect the 
loans and to foreclose the collateral securing them. 
The Defendants filed their Answer and Counterclaim on June 7, 
1991. The Counterclaim alleges seven separate causes of action. 
The seventh, which is for accounting and declaratory and injunctive 
relief was dismissed by stipulation of the parties. Thus, six 
causes of action of the Counterclaim are before this Court for 
review, all of which will be discussed in detail below: 
1 Breach of Agreement to Fund. 
2. Willful Breach of Contract and Economic Duress. 
3. Promissory Estoppel. 
4. Negligent Structuring and Disbursal. 
5. Control and Self Dealing. 
6. Breach of Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
The Defendants also asserted affirmative defenses to State 
Bank's claims. They have attempted to veil the precise issues 
relating to the affirmative defenses by improperly combining them 
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with the counterclaim issues together under one general analysis. 
For example, at page 7 of their Brief, the Appellants state, in 
relation to the affirmative defenses: 
Claims [similar to the counterclaim] were asserted by way 
of affirmative defenses contained in Troy's answer. 
This is not totally correct, and the differences could be 
important. As a matter of fact, even though there were many 
affirmative defenses originally pled by the Appellants, only four 
were plead as both affirmative defenses and counterclaims, those 
being breach of fiduciary duty (tenth defense), breach of duties of 
good faith and fair dealing (eleventh defense), economic duress 
(fourteenth defense) and improper disbursement (seventh defense). 
After discovery, State Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment seeking the dismissal of the Defendants' counterclaim. 
State Bank sought dismissal under two separate arguments, first 
that the claims were time barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations and second that the Appellants had failed to make a 
prima facie case, as a matter of law. Argument was heard and the 
trial court carefully analyzed each cause of action of the 
Counterclaim, as applied to the law, and ultimately granted State 
Bank's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on all causes but one. 
By order dated July 9, 1992, and entered July 16, 1992, the Court 
carefully articulated its findings (R-0490-0495). A copy of the 
trial court's July 9, 1992, Order is included in the Addendum as 
Exhibit A. The Order dismisses some of the causes of action on the 
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statute of limitations and some for failure to make a prima facie 
case as a matter of law. These counterclaims wi I I be discussed in 
detail below. 
State Bank then filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
its Complaint. Troy opposed the motion arguing, among other 
things, that its affirmative defenses barred State Bank's action. 
The hearing was held on October 9, 1992, and, after taking the 
matter under advisement, the court granted State Bank's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment except for two issues. Contrary to the 
statement of the Appellant at page 10 of their Brief, the Court's 
dismissal of the Defendants' defenses was not entirely based upon 
the statute of limitations. The court's rulings on two of the four 
issues were based upon the Defendants' failure to make its case, as 
a matter of law. (See discussion under Point IV, below.) A copy 
of the trial court's November 13, 1992, Order is included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit B. 
In granting both of the summary judgments, the trial court 
reserved the issue as to the amount of attorney's fees and the 
alleged improper disbursement of the February 10, 1987 loan. The 
trial was held on December 10, 1992, on those issues. At the 
trial, Troy Hygro did not present any evidence on any issues. 
Thus, the trial court ruled in State Bank's favor finding that 
there was no improper disbursement of the February 10, 1987 loan. 
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STATEMENT OF FACT8 
1. Sometime in early 1985, Troy Hygro approached State Bank 
for the purpose of obtaining a loan for additional greenhouses to 
be constructed upon property which Troy Hygro leased. (R-1607 
(Deposition of James Markell, p. 33)). 
2. Each of the parties knew that the loan being sought was to 
be approved by the Small Business Administration of the United 
States Government ("SBA"). (R-466 (Affidavit of Michael R. Kehl, 
f 6)). 
3. Troy Hygro now claims that during this loan application 
process, State Bank committed and promised that the loan would be 
granted and funded immediately upon the approval by the SBA. 
However, even the testimony of the only two witnesses testifying 
for the Defendants in this case, Michael R. Kehl and James Markell, 
proves that no such promise or commitment was ever made. (See 
discussion under Point IA.2., below). 
4. There is no written document of any kind which obligates 
State Bank to advance the loan immediately upon SBA approval, nor 
at any other specific time. 
5. On September 3, 1985, the SBA issued its written 
authorization for the new loan. (R-381 (Affidavit of Leland 0. 
Fife, f 11)). 
6. However, by the time the SBA approval was given, State 
Bank had other existing loans outstanding up to the maximum allowed 
by the regulatory limits governing State Bank. Therefore, State 
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Bank did not immediately lend the funds pursuant to the SBA 
approval. (R-381 (Fife Affid., 5 11)). 
7. During the negotiations and processes to complete and 
obtain the SBA approval, State Bank did not know it would be out of 
money when the SBA approval was granted. The Bai ik's lending 
capacity varies from time to time, and there is no way the Bank 
could have known at any time significantly prior to September 3, 
1985, that it would not have money to lend when the SBA approval 
was given. (R-381 (Fife Affid., ffl 13-14)). 
8. State Bank moved as quickly as it could to remedy the 
situation. Within thirty (3 0) days, the Bank had funds to lend and 
the loan was closed on or about October 7, 1985. (R-382 (Fife 
Affid., f 15)). 
9. By everyone's admission, immediately prior to Troy Hygro 
signing the loan documents on October 7, 1985, Troy Hygro was not 
obligated to complete the loan. Nevertheless, Troy Hygro elected 
to borrow the funds and executed the Note, Trust Deed and other 
loan documents. State Bank advanced the $325,000 on or about the 
date of the loan. (R-380 (Fife Affid., ff 7-8), R-1564, 1947 (Kehl 
Deposition, pp. 207, 379)). 
10. To remedy cash flow problems, and to provide for capital 
purchases, on February 10, 1987, State Bank loaned an additional 
$60,000 to Troy Hygro. (R-382 (Fife Affid. f 17)). The 
Defendants executed the Note and security documents to memorialize 
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the loan. (R-499-502. (Affidavit of Leland 0. Fife dated August 
13, 1992 ffl 6-8)). 
11. On November 7, 1988, the Defendants obtained another loan 
from State Bank for the purpose of facilitating the takeover of the 
business by one of the Kehl brothers, Keith Kehl, and his wife 
Karen Sue Kehl. 
12. The Plaintiff filed this foreclosure action on December 
13, 1990. The Defendants filed their Answer and Counterclaim on 
June 7, 1991. 
13. The Plaintiff made a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
as to the issues raised in the Defendants7 Counterclaim. The 
Defendants filed an affidavit and a memorandum opposing the motion. 
Argument was held on June 24, 1992. On July 9, 1992, the court 
entered its order dismissing the Counterclaim, except one part of 
one cause of action. (R-490-495). 
14. Then, the Plaintiff made a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment as to its Complaint. The Defendants resisted the motion, 
primarily relying on their affirmative defenses. Argument was held 
on October 9, 1992. On that date, the court granted the motion, 
except for one part of one affirmative defense. (R-699-700). 
15. Troy Hygro claims that the loan proceeds from the 
February 10, 1987, loan were improperly disbursed. This is the 
only issue that went to trial. At the trial, Lee Fife testified 
that the proceeds were properly disbursed consistent with the loan 
documents. (R-1285-1303 (Reporter's Trial Transcript, December 10, 
9 
1992)). Troy Hygro did not put on any proof as to the alleged 
wrongful disbursement of the February 10, 1987 loan. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court properly dismissed four of the six causes 
of action in the Counterclaim based upon the statute of 
limitations. 
2. Even if the trial court erred in dismissing those four 
counterclaims based on the statute of limitations, the claims 
should be dismissed as a matter of law because the Defendants did 
not make a prima facie case which would entitle it to recovery. 
3. The fifth and sixth causes of action of the Counterclaim 
were properly dismissed by the trial court because the Defendants 
failed to make a prima facie case. 
4. The Defendants have failed to marshall the proof necessary 
to show that the trial court's rulings were not correct in relation 
to the affirmative defenses raised by the Defendants. 
5. The arguments made by the Defendants in opposition to the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in relation to the 
affirmative defenses fail as a matter of law. The defenses in 
relation to the October 1985 loan and the February 1987 loan were 
never raised as affirmative defenses and thus should not be 
considered. Even if they are considered, they are barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations because they are in reality 
counterclaims, not defenses, and because the Defendants did not 
10 
make a prima facie case independent of the statute of limitations 
issues. 
6. The Defendants did not establish a prima facie case in the 
trial court on their affirmative defenses of economic duress, and 
breach of duties of good faith, fair dealing and fiduciary duty, 
and thus the trial court's summary judgment overruling those 
affirmative defenses must be sustained. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH 
OF THE COUNTERCLAIMS 
This Court will notice a decidedly different approach between 
State Bank's Brief and Defendants' Brief. The Defendants fail to 
separately address the six separate causes of action in the 
Counterclaim, and the four separate affirmative defenses alleged in 
the Answer. The law requires that each separate claim be 
separately addressed. Au v. Au, 626 P.2d 173 (Hawaii 1981). Since 
the issues are fact sensitive to a degree, and since many involve 
separate analysis, the Respondent will address each of the 
Defendants' counterclaims one at a time. A copy of the Defendants' 
Answer and Counterclaim is included in the Addendum as Exhibit C. 
A. First Cause of Action, Breach of Contract. Defendants 
first claim that State Bank was legally bound to disburse the 
initial $325,000 loan immediately upon SBA approval; in other 
words, that there was a contract obligating State Bank to fund the 
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loan immediately when SBA approval was given. (R-104, 107 
(Counterclaim f5 7, 21-22)). There is no writing evidencing the 
obligation, and thus the claimed contract is oral. The trial court 
found that the breach alleged by the Defendants occurred on or 
about September 3, 1985, when the approval by the SBA was given to 
State Bank and State Bank did not advance the funds. (R-491 (Order 
dated July 9, 1992, f 3)). The trial court further found that 
since there was no writing to evidence the obligation, the contract 
was oral and thus governed by the four-year statute of limitations. 
(R-491, 491a, 492 (Order dated July 9, 1992)). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 provides that the following have a 
four-year period of limitations: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation or liability 
not founded upon an instrument in writing. 
The alleged cause of action accrued on September 3, 1985. The 
Counterclaim was not filed until June 7, 1991, some five years and 
nine months later. The fact that the Defendants' claims are 
asserted by way of counterclaim, rather than a complaint itself, 
makes no difference, since the statutes of limitation apply equally 
to both counterclaims and affirmative complaints. See generally, 
Lindsay v. Woodward, 5 Utah 2d 183, 299 P.2d 619 (1956). 
The Defendants7 only argument relating to the counterclaims 
asserts that the loan documents from the loan which was ultimately 
granted on October 7, 1985, are sufficient to constitute a writing 
so that the six-year provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 apply. 
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Preliminarily, the Court should note that the Defendants state at 
page 24 of their Brief, that it is undisputed that State Bank 
agreed to have the funds available immediately upon SBA approval. 
That statement is absolutely false. It is disputed. State Bank 
denies that it ever agreed to fund the loan at any given time. The 
page reference cited by Defendants does not sustain the proposition 
stated. 
The documents upon which the Defendants rely do not invoke the 
six-year statute of limitations for two reasons. First, the 
documents relate to an entirely different contract. The Defendants 
attempt to rely on the loan documents from the October 7, 1985, 
loan as the writings sufficient to engage the six-year statute of 
limitations. But, the contract which they claim was breached was 
not the loan itself, but a prior oral agreement to fund the loan at 
a specified time. The oral agreement claimed by Defendants was 
allegedly breached on September 3, 1985, when State Bank couldn't 
fund the loan when SBA approval was given. There are no documents 
relating to that agreement. The actual loan documents weren't even 
prepared until a month after the contract upon which Defendants' 
sue was allegedly breached and several months after it was 
allegedly entered. The loan documents from October 7, 1985, are 
part of different contract. 
Secondly, even if it were all part of the same contract, the 
material terms of that contract claimed by Defendants (promise to 
fund the loan immediately upon SBA approval) is not written. If a 
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contract is part oral and part written, the statute of limitations 
regarding oral contracts applies. Chilson v. Capital Bank of 
Miami, Florida, 701 P.2d 903, 907 (Kan. 1985); Moran v. Stowell, 
724 P.2d 396, 399 (Wash. App. 1986). In Chilson v. Capital Bank of 
Miami, Florida, supra, the court succinctly stated the controlling 
law: 
A contract which is partly in writing and partly oral is 
in legal effect an oral contract so far as the statute of 
limitations is concerned. The writing necessary to have 
the additional protection of the five-year statute must 
be full and complete in itself so as not to require proof 
of extrinsic facts to establish all essential contractual 
terms. 
Id. at 907 (citations omitted). 
At best, the contract alleged by Defendants is part oral and 
part written. It is treated as an oral contract and the four-year 
statute of limitations applies. 
The Defendants rely exclusively on the case Evans v. Pickett 
Brothers Farms, 17 Utah 2d 375, 499 P.2d 273 (1972), for the 
proposition that any oral promises made while the parties were 
negotiating a written contract are within the six-year statute of 
limitations. The Pickett Brothers Farms case does not help the 
Defendants at all. While the contract in that case was prepared 
after the contract was allegedly entered, it contained all material 
terms, including the one sued upon. The documents relied upon by 
the Defendants do not contain the material term which they claim 
was breached and thus the four-year statute of limitations applies. 
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The trial court granted summary judgment on this cause of 
action based on the statute of limitations. Other grounds for 
dismissal were argued. The trial court never reached them because 
of its ruling on the statute of limitations. Even if this Court 
finds that the trial court erred in its statute of limitation 
ruling, the Defendants have failed to make their prima facie case 
and thus the dismissal must be upheld. See, e.g., Global 
Recreation v. Cedar Hills Development, 614 P. 2d 155, 157 (Utah 
1980) (trial court's decision can be sustained on grounds other 
than those relied on by trial court if grounds have been argued and 
briefed by both parties, were presented to trial court for 
adjudication, and do not require resolution of disputed factual 
issues). Cf. Viehweg v. Thompson, 647 P.2d 311, 314-315 (Idaho 
1982) (error by trial court in ruling that counterclaim was barred 
by statute of limitations was harmless because of trial court's 
finding on comparative negligence). 
1. THE ALLEGED CONTRACT FAILS BECAUSE THERE WAS NO MUTUALITY 
OF OBLIGATION. 
In order for a contract to be binding, there must be mutuality 
of obligation; that is, each of the parties must be bound to their 
respective performance under the terms of the contract. The 
general rule is well stated as follows: 
[Mjutuality of obligation is essential to the validity of 
an executory bilateral contract which is based solely on 
mutual promises or covenants and unless both parties are 
legally bound, so that each may hold the other liable for 
its breach, the contract lacks mutuality and neither 
party is bound. 
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Security Bank & Trust v. Bogard, 494 N.E.2d 965, 969 (Ind. App. 
1986), quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 100(1) (1963). 
In this case, both State Bank and the Defendants acknowledge 
that the Borrowers were not bound at any point to complete the 
loan. (R-1947 (Kehl Deposition, p. 379), R-380 (Fife Affidavit, f 
9), R-1664 (Markell Deposition, p. 90), stating "I would say, we 
didn't have a commitment but they were committed")) . In fact, when 
it was apparent that State Bank did not have the funds to loan Troy 
Hygro, the completed SBA package was given to Mr. Markell so that 
he could try to find financing using that package through another 
bank (SBA approvals are assignable). (R-1650-1653 (Markell 
Deposition, pp. 76-79), R-381 (Fife Affid., f 12)). Since the 
Borrowers were not obligated to complete the loan, the requisite 
element of mutuality of obligation is not present, and there was no 
enforceable contract which could have been breached by State Bank. 
The case Security Bank and Trust Co. v Bogard, 494 N.E.2d 965 
(Ind. App. 1986), is virtually identical to the case at bar. In 
that case, a Mr. Bogard was a farmer in Indiana, who had done 
business with Security Bank and Trust for 33 years. As he had done 
for many previous years, Mr. Bogard went into the bank to take out 
his 1983 credit line. He was informed by the bank officers that 
because of prior years carry over losses, the bank would need 
additional collateral. There were discussions about the pledge of 
additional property, but the loan committee turned down Bogard's 
application. Bogard then attempted to find financing elsewhere, 
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but was unsuccessful. Some time later, the bank filed an action 
against Bogard because he was in default on existing promissory 
notes. 
Bogard claimed that the bank breached an oral contract to 
renew his line of credit. The court held, as a matter of law, that 
there was no contract upon which a breach could be found because 
there was no mutuality of obligation. In so holding the court 
stated: 
Here, Bogard was not legally bound to borrow the money 
from Security. In fact, Bogard testified he unsuccess-
fully attempted to seek financing elsewhere in lieu of 
obtaining a loan from Security. Because Bogard had no 
obligation to obtain his financing from Security, any 
alleged contract between Security and Bogard lacked 
mutuality of obligation and was thus unenforceable. 
Id. at 968. This is precisely the instant case. Any alleged 
contract fails as a matter of law because it lacked mutuality of 
obligation. A copy of the Security Bank and Trust Co. v. Bogard 
case is included in the Addendum as Exhibit D. 
2. THE ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT BETWEEN STATE BANK AND TROY 
HYGRO IS TOO INDEFINITE TO GIVE RISE TO A CONTRACT. 
In order for an oral contract to exist, there must be an 
offer, acceptance, consideration, the terms must be definite, the 
parties must have a sufficient understanding of the terms of the 
contract so as to know what they are bound to do, and the existence 
of the contract must be established by clear, unequivocal and 
definite testimony, or other evidence of the same quality. See 
Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979); Oberhansley v. 
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Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977); Pingree v. Continental 
Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976); Morgan v. 
Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695f 696 (Utah 1976) . The burden of 
proving the existence of a contract is on the party seeking its 
enforcement. Oberhansley, supra, 572 P.2d at 1386. 
There can be no contract unless the obligations of the 
respective parties are spelled out with sufficient definiteness to 
allow enforcement. Oberhansley v. Earle, supra, 572 P.2d at 1386; 
Hansen v. Snell, 11 Utah 2d 64, 354 P.2d 1070, 1072 (1960). An 
agreement that does not define the terms thereto cannot be enforced 
as a contract because lack of definiteness is equivalent to a 
failure of the meeting of the minds which is an essential element 
to the formation of a contract. See, Efco Distributing, Inc. v. 
Perrin, 412 P.2d 615, 616 (Utah 1966). 
Courts have addressed the question of definiteness in the 
context of a loan agreement between a bank and a borrower. Marine 
Midland Bank v. Herriot, 412 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. App. 1980) (finding 
at summary judgment that there was no enforceable agreement where 
significant provisions of a new loan, such as the term of the loan, 
how it would be secured, manner and timing of disbursement, events 
of default and the manner and timing of interest payments remained 
open) (emphasis added); Calosso v. First National Bank of Pompano 
Beach, 143 So.2d 343 (Fla. App. 1962) (there was no loan agreement 
where the essentials of the agreement, such as the time for 
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advancement, time and method of repayment, and rate of interest 
were conspicuously absent) (emphasis added). 
In summary, in order for an agreement to be binding, it must 
be sufficiently definite as to its terms and requirements to enable 
the court to determine what acts are to be performed and when 
performance is complete, so that the court can fix definitely the 
legal liability of the parties. Lessley v. Hardage, 727 P. 2d 440, 
446 (Kan. 1986). Even by the Defendants' testimony, the contract 
alleged in this case was not definite enough to be enforced. 
Throughout their Brief, Defendants summarily state the key to 
their entire case, that State Bank "promised to have the funds 
available immediately upon SBA approval." (Brief of Appellants at 
24) . Yet there is no admissible evidence anywhere in the record 
stating that State Bank would fund the loan immediately upon SBA 
approval. Even the Defendants themselves don't say so. In his 
deposition, James Markell, the local Troy Hygro representative with 
whom most of the discussions with the bank took place, gives a 
chronological account of all things that were discussed between 
Troy Hygro and State Bank. As to the alleged agreement to make the 
loan and the advancement of funds, Mr. Markell testified: 
A. That up until approximately July of 1985, the 
discussions with the bank were preliminary, and Mr. fife was 
careful to make sure that everyone understood that there was 
no commitment to loan. (R-1607-1614, 1622-1624, 1629-1632 
(Markell Deposition, pp. 33-40, 48-50, 55-58)). 
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B. Beginning in early July of 1985, the pressures began 
to set in as far as the time table was concerned, and Mr. 
Markell began to mention to Mr. Fife the urgency of getting 
the loan closed. (R-1637 (Markell Deposition, p. 63)). 
C. Several times thereafter, Fife made the comments like 
"it looks pretty good." (R-1640-1642 (Markell Deposition, pp. 
66-68)). 
D. When the verbal SBA approval was given, Fife stated 
that it looked good, and that the bank would now do the formal 
application. (R-1642-1643 (Markell Deposition, pp. 68-69)). 
E. Thereafter, several times Mr. Fife indicated that the 
loan would be coming soon. (R-1644-1645, 1647-1650 (Markell 
Deposition, pp. 70-71, 73-76)). 
F. Markell assumed the loan would be granted consistent 
with the pro-formas and proposed construction schedule because 
no one ever told Troy that it wouldn't be. According to Mr. 
Markell, "Probably saying nothing says it all." Troy Hygro 
submitted pro-formas early in the application process which 
projected a commencement date of August 31, at the latest, and 
since no one at State Bank said those dates couldn't be met, 
the Defendants assumed they would be met. (R-1659-1660 
(Markell Deposition, pp. 85-86)). 
G. When the SBA written approval finally came, Mr. Fife 
advised Mr. Markell that the funds were not available, and 
that the bank would get the money, but he did not know when it 
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was going to be. (R-1649-1650, 1656 (Markell Deposition, pp. 
15-16, 82)). 
Copies of each of these pages from the Markell deposition are 
included in the Addendum as Exhibit E. 
Similarly, in his deposition, Michael Kehl, the President of 
Troy Hygro, outlines what things the bank said to him or did which 
Troy Hygro claims rose to the level of obligation. He states: 
A. The bank's commitment to lend was inherent in the 
schedules that had been provided. (R-1563 (Kehl Deposition, 
p. 206)). 
B. It wasn't what the Bank said that forms the basis for 
the obligation, but what it didn't say. (R-1564 (Kehl 
Deposition, p. 207)). 
C. The commitment was made as an integral part of the 
construction schedule provided as part of the loan 
application. (R-1953 (Kehl Deposition, p. 385)). 
D. The agreement was implied because of the construction 
schedule. (R-1953 (Kehl Deposition, p. 385)). 
E. There was not an exact conversation where the bank 
agreed to the construction schedule. (R-1954 (Kehl Deposition, 
p. 386)). 
F. The Bank had every opportunity to advise Troy Hygro 
if the construction schedule was unrealistic, but never did. 
(R-1954 (Kehl Deposition, p. 386)). 
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G. The Bank never said that it could advance the funds 
in accordance with any construction schedule• (R-1954-1955 
(Kehl Deposition, pp. 386-387)). 
Copies of these pages from Michael Kehl's deposition are included 
in the Addendum as Exhibit F. 
Defendants also cite the Affidavit of Michael Kehl (R-466) for 
their claim that State Bank promised to fund the loan immediately 
upon SBA approval. It too fails to state what they say it states. 
First of all, the affidavit states inadmissible conclusions rather 
than facts. State Bank objected to the affidavit at the time of 
hearing. (R-1104, 1105 (Reporter's Hearing Transcript June 24, 
1992, pp. 3-4)). Secondly, to the extent that it is inconsistent 
with the deposition testimony, it should not be allowed. Webster 
v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). Finally, even if the 
affidavit is considered, all it says is that State Bank agreed to 
lend the funds "pending SBA approval." That is a far cry from the 
allegation that the funds would be advanced "immediately upon SBA 
approval." 
As the Court can readily see, all of the proof relied on by 
Defendants is conclusory in nature, and constitutes nothing more 
than assumptions, predictions or expectations by Defendants. In 
summary, the Defendants7 claim that they provided anticipated 
construction schedules to the bank in February, and the parties 
knew that SBA approval was required, and because the bank didn't 
say it couldn't meet the schedules or that it wouldn't advance the 
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funds upon SBA approval, that it was bound to do so. The cases 
hold to the contrary. The fact of the matter is, the bank was 
doing its best to get the loan completed as quickly as it could (R-
382 (Fife Affidavit, f 10)). There is a big difference between 
working toward schedules and being bound by them. The Defendants 
have not bridged that difference. 
The first essential element of contract, that is definiteness 
of terms, is absent. Even taking the Defendants' claimed facts as 
true, there is no way that either the parties or this Court could 
determine what acts are to be performed and when performance is 
complete. Thus, the claimed contract fails, consistent with the 
cases outlined above. Lessley v. Hardage, 727 P. 2d 440 (Kan. 
1986) . 
In summary, the trial court's statute of limitations ruling 
was correct. And even if it was not correct, the contract fails 
because there was no mutuality of obligation, and because the 
alleged contract was not sufficiently definite even under the 
Borrowers7 proof. The trial court's ruling should be upheld 
independent of the statute of limitation issues. 
B. Second Cause of Action, Willful Breach of Contract and 
Economic Duress. 
In their second cause of action, the Defendants restate their 
breach of contract argument, state that it is willful, and then 
state that the $325,000 loan and $60,000 loan were signed under 
economic duress. The allegation that the breach was willful adds 
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nothing to the claims under the first cause of action and no 
further mention need be made of it. The trial court found that the 
Borrowers did not meet the proof on their claim for economic duress 
and thus dismissed it. (R-0494 (Order dated July 9, 1992)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has mandated proof of three elements in 
order to establish a claim of economic duress. Heglar Ranch, Inc., 
v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980). Those elements are: 
(1) wrongful act by the acting party; (2) which puts initial party 
in fear; (3) compelling him to do something against his will. See 
generally, Weisen v. Short, 604 P.2d 1191 (Colo. App. 1979); Frank 
Culver Electric, Inc., v. Jorgenson, 664 P. 2d 226 (Ariz. App. 
1983); Nord v. Eastside Association Ltd., 664 P.2d 4 (Wash. App. 
1983) . 
The Defendants7 claim of economic duress in these 
circumstances fails, as a matter of law, on two grounds. 
1. THE ACTS OF THE BANK WERE NOT WRONGFUL. 
The first element of a claim for economic duress requires that 
the actions of the acting party be wrongful. Heglar Ranch, Inc., 
v. Stillman, supra at 1391. In this case, the acts of State Bank 
were not wrongful. Mr. Lee Fife states that at all times he was 
doing his best to get the loan completed (R-380, 382 (Fife Affid., 
ff 10-15) ) . The Defendants admit that they were on good terms with 
Mr. Fife, that he tried hard to do things right, and that the Bank 
seemed to be doing its best to get the matter resolved. (R-1869, 
1951 (Kehl Deposition, pp. 300, 383)). Appellants have not pointed 
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to any proof to show that the acts of the Bank were wrongful, thus 
the economic duress claim fails on the first element. 
2. THE BANK DID NOT "COMPEL" TROY HYGRO TO DO ANYTHING. 
Finally, the last element of a cause of action for economic 
duress, is that the acting party must compel the other to do 
something against his will. Heglar Ranch, Inc., v. Stillman, supra 
at 1391. In this case, State Bank did not compel Troy Hygro to do 
anything. To the contrary, Troy Hygro knew that the Bank was not 
compelling it to go through with the loan. (R-1947 (Kehl 
Deposition, p. 379)). State Bank even went so far as to give the 
completed SBA loan package to the Defendants so that they could try 
to get the loan somewhere else. (R-1650-1653 (Markell Deposition, 
pp. 76-79), R-381 (Fife Affid., f 12)). Mr. Fife encouraged the 
Defendants to try to get financing elsewhere. (Id.) On these 
facts, it can hardly be said that State Bank "compelled" Troy Hygro 
to complete the loan in October of 1985. 
The case Heglar Ranch, Inc., v. Stillman, supra, is 
conceptionally controlling on this case. In that case one Juanita 
Stillman had entered an agreement for the purchase of certain land 
located in West Jordan, Utah. The deal failed because she was 
unable to secure the financing with which to pay the purchase price 
and the escrow was therefore terminated. A short time later the 
party with whom she had been dealing advised her that they were 
still willing to continue the deal, but insisted on the imposition 
of additional conditions and covenants, including the execution of 
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a promissory note. The defendant Stillman balked at the additional 
conditions, but nevertheless went through with the transaction. 
She defaulted, and the plaintiff sued on the promissory note which 
was imposed as the additional condition. The defendant Stillman 
asserted economic duress as a defense to the promissory note. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant, and the decision was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Court stated: 
Moreover, defendants were not placed in such fear as 
would deprive them of their free will—by defendant 
Juanita Stillman7s own admission, had they chosen to walk 
away from the negotiations, the only consequence thereof 
would have been the loss of whatever benefits the deal 
might have afforded them had it been closed. To label as 
"duress" such incentive to complete the transaction would 
have the effect of permitting any party to avoid a 
contractual obligation on the ground the performance was 
agreed to only because, in the absence of a promise, the 
party would be denied the benefit of the bargain. 
Id. at 1391-1392 (emphasis added). A copy of the Heglar Ranch, 
Inc., v. Stillman case is included in the addendum as Exhibit G. 
In the instant case, like Juanita Stillman, the Defendants 
could have walked away from this transaction at any time. The only 
consequence would have been the loss of the benefit of the 
Plaintiff's loan. As is set forth in the language quoted above, to 
extend the meaning of being "compelled" to Plaintiff's claims would 
allow any party to any contract to claim economic duress, since 
presumably every contract is entered for the financial or other 
benefit of the contract. The Defendants were not compelled to act, 
and the trial court was correct in dismissing the economic duress 
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claim for the Defendants' failure to make a prima facie case, as a 
matter of law. 
Had the trial court reached the statute of limitations issue, 
it would have imposed the four-year statute of limitations and 
would have dismissed the cause of action on that ground as well. 
Under the statutory scheme for limitation of actions in Utah, there 
are certain specifically stated periods for some types of action. 
Then, for those not specifically mentioned, there is a "catch-all" 
limitation of four years imposed. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 
(1992) . Since there is no specific period of limitation for 
economic duress, it falls within the catch-all provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-25 and is four years. The cause of action 
obviously accrued when the notes were allegedly signed under 
economic duress on October 7, 1985, and February 10, 1987. The 
action was not filed by the Defendants until more than four years 
later. The claims of economic duress are barred by the statute of 
limitations and the trial court's finding and order must be upheld 
on this ground as well. 
C. Third Cause of Action; Promissory Estoppel. 
Defendants7 third cause of action alleges that State Bank 
promised to loan the funds immediately upon SBA approval and then 
failed to do so. In some ways this cause of action simply 
rephrases the breach of contract claims under the first cause of 
action. The trial court found that the period of limitations for 
promissory estoppel was four years, and that the claimed cause of 
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action accrued when the Bank failed to disburse funds upon SBA 
approval. (R-491, 491a, 492 (Order dated July 9, 1992)). The 
statute of limitations for promissory estoppel is indeed four years 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. Like the claim of economic 
duress, since there is no specific statutory period stated, it is 
covered by the four-year catch-all provision of Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-25. Once again, the claim was not asserted until five years 
and nine months after the alleged breach. The trial court's ruling 
is correct and must be upheld. 
Even if the claim of promissory estoppel were not time barred, 
the Defendants did not make out a prima facie case of promissory 
estoppel, as a matter of law. Originally, promissory estoppel was 
merely a substitute for consideration in the formation of contracts 
generally. See, e.g., Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d. 
570 (1953) . The doctrine has been expanded, however, to allow 
recovery in situations where at least two essential elements are 
present: (1) A definite promise made to another party; and (2) 
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on 
the part of the promisee. Id, at 575. The Defendants promissory 
estoppel claim fails, as a matter of law, because neither of these 
two essential elements are present. 
1. THERE WAS NO PROMISE. 
The first essential element of promissory estoppel is a 
promise. Irwin Concrete, Inc., v. Sun Coast Properties, Inc., 653 
P.2d 1331, 1337 (Wash. App. 1982); See, Ravelo by Ravelo v. Hawaii 
28 
County, 658 P.2d 883 (Hawaii 1983). In Security Bank and Trust 
Company v. Bogard, 494 N.E.2d 965 (Ind. App. 1986) (Exhibit D in 
Addendum), on facts almost identical to these, the court denied the 
plaintiff's promissory estoppel claims, as a matter of law, because 
there was no promise. The Court stated: 
We need not consider the last three of these elements 
[the elements of promissory estoppel] because Bogardfs 
argument is fatally flawed on the first element—the 
existence of a promise. 
Id. at 968. 
In order for a promise to be enforceable under the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel it must be clear and unambiguous. The terms of 
the promise must be certain, as there can be no promissory estoppel 
without a real promise. Promissory estoppel cannot be based on 
preliminary negotiations and discussions or an agreement to 
negotiate the terms of a contract. Keil v. Glacier Park Inc., 614 
P.2d 502 (Mont. 1980). 
In the instant case, by the Defendants' own admission, the 
Bank never made a promise as to when, or even if, the loan would 
ultimately be granted. (R-1954-1955 (Kehl Deposition, pp. 386-
387)). The exact conversations which took place between the Bank 
and the Defendants are set forth in detail under Point IA.2., 
above. None of the statements which the Defendants claim were made 
by bank officers amount to a promise sufficiently unequivocal and 
definite to sustain a claim for promissory estoppel. 
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B. THERE WAS NO DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE BY THE DEFENDANTS. 
Conceptionally, the heart of a claim for promissory estoppel 
is detrimental reliance by the promisee. 
The case Ravarino v. Price, supra, contains a thorough and 
intelligent discussion of the element of detrimental reliance in 
the context of promissory estoppel. In holding that the conduct in 
that case was insufficient, as a matter of law, the Supreme Court 
stated that in order for reliance to be sufficient it must be in a 
situation where the promise was designed to and did in fact induce 
significant change of position by the promisee. Id. at 575, 576. 
See also, Southeastern Equipment Co. v. Mauss, 696 P. 2d 1187 (Utah 
1985) (holding that there could be no promissory estoppel where the 
party claiming it had not changed position to their detriment in 
reliance on the promise). 
Other courts have also stressed the importance of the element 
of detrimental reliance. Lucero v. Goldberg, 804 P.2d 206 (Colo. 
App. 19990) (stating that an order to rise to the level of 
promissory estoppel there must be a tangible act or a 
relinquishment of some significant right in reliance on promise); 
Gilbert v. City of Caldwell, 732 P. 2d 355 (Ida. App. 1987) (holding 
that the detriment suffered in reliance on the alleged promise must 
be substantial in an economic sense). 
In the instant case, Defendants have not cited any evidence in 
the record to establish their reliance on the alleged promise. 
They did not change position, and they did not waive any rights or 
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claims which they previously had. They did gather information, 
obtain an appraisal and make general preparations, but this is done 
in every loan and hardly rises to the level of reliance required. 
And, it was all done before the Defendants claim there was a 
commitment. The trial court's dismissal of the promissory estoppel 
claim was proper both in statute of limitations grounds, and on the 
merits. 
D. Fourth Cause of Action, Negligence. 
In their fourth cause of action, the Defendants claim that 
State Bank was negligent in the structuring, processing and 
disbursal of each of the October 1987 loan and the February 1987 
loan. The trial court found that the statute of limitations for 
negligence is four years under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-25. (R-0493 (Order dated July 9, 1992)). The Utah Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that the statute of limitations for 
negligence is four years. Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc., v. 
Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11 (Utah 1990). Therefore, the 
court found that as to the loans of October 7, 1985, and February 
10, 1987, the claims of negligence were time barred. The 
Defendants did not claim negligence in relation to the November 7, 
1988 loan and none is argued in the Brief of Appellants before this 
Court (R-1191 (Reporter's Hearing Transcript, June 24, 1992)). 
Thus, without question, the trial court's dismissal of the fourth 
cause of action for negligence was proper. 
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E. Fifth Cause of Action, Control and Self Dealing, and Sixth 
Cause of Action, Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
The fifth and sixth causes of action of the Defendants' 
counterclaim will be addressed together since they are addressed 
together in the Defendants' Brief and since the issues in relation 
to them are essentially the same. In their Brief, the Defendants 
allege four separate facts which they claim give rise to the claims 
of control and self dealing, and breach of duties of good faith and 
fair dealing. First, they state that the Bank admitted that the 
$60,000 loan was to resolve the funding problem created by State 
Bank in connection with the $325,000 loan. This is absolutely 
incorrect. There is no citation to the record which accompanies 
the allegation, and there is certainly no proof in the record where 
State Bank admitted that the $60,000 loan was given to resolve the 
alleged delay in funding. Conclusory statements without citation 
to the record will not be considered by the Court. Marchant v. 
Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah App. 1989). 
Secondly, the Defendants state that "State Bank materially 
changed the terms of the original loan documents." (Appellants' 
Brief at 26.) This statement implies that the documents were 
changed after they were signed. This is incorrect, at best. In 
his deposition, Michael Kehl admitted that the Defendants did not 
claim that the documents had been altered after signature. (R-
1925-1928 (Kehl Depos. pp. 356-360)). The only allegation in 
relation to the November 7, 1988, loan, is that State Bank prepared 
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the documents with Troy Hygro as the borrower and Keith and Karen 
Sue Kehl as guarantors, instead of vice versa. Also, the 
Appellants allege that State Bank should not have insisted that 
Keith and Karen Sue Kehl guaranty the earlier loans as a condition 
to making the third loan. Once again, there is no proof in the 
record on these two allegations. 
Defendants claim that these things alone constitute an issue 
of fact as to State Bank's self dealing and breaches of duty of 
good faith. The trial court found as a matter of law that these 
claims did not rise to the level of improper control or a breach of 
good faith. (R-0494 (Order dated July 9, 1992)). Certainly the 
Bank has the right to insist on a guaranty from anyone it chooses. 
There is absolutely no proof in the record that State Bank exerted 
any improper pressure upon Keith Kehl and Karen Sue Kehl to 
guaranty the prior loans as a condition to granting the third loan. 
As to the claims that the guarantor and borrower are reversed on 
the loan documents for the November 7, 1988 loan, the documents 
were signed as is (R-507-509 (Third Fife Affid., flfl 26-31)) and 
thus any claimed agreement that is inconsistent with the written 
documents is barred as a matter of contract law by the parol 
evidence rule. See generally, Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 
(Utah 1985). And, even if the claims weren't barred by the parol 
evidence rule, it makes no difference whether the parties are 
guarantors or principal obligors since they are both liable anyway. 
The findings of the trial court on this issue must be upheld. 
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Defendants next claim that there is an issue of fact as to 
whether a special or fiduciary relationship was developed between 
the Bank and the Defendants. (Brief of Appellants, pp. 27-28.) 
The Defendants' Brief states two alleged facts in support of the 
claimed fiduciary relationship. First, the Defendants claim that 
"Troy relied totally on the Bank's creative financing ideas to 
remedy the situation." (Brief of Appellants at 28). Second, 
"there is evidence that the Bank paid itself first from the 
proceeds of the November 7, 1988 loan, contrary to what was 
represented to the SBA and without full disclosure to Troy." 
(Brief of Appellants at 28) . Both of these "facts" are alleged 
without reference to the record. State Bank has no idea what the 
basis of these alleged facts are, and is at a loss as to how to 
respond to the unsubstantiated claims. Utah R. App. P. 24(e) 
requires citation to the record. Defendants have not done so, 
Plaintiff is not aware of any facts in the record to substantiate 
the Defendants' claims, and they should not be allowed to rely on 
them. Arguments without citation to the record will not be 
considered. Marchant v. Park City, supra, at 682. 
However, even if the facts as stated are true, they certainly 
do not give rise to a fiduciary relationship. Ordinarily, no 
fiduciary nor confidential relationship exists between a bank and 
its borrower. Pulse v. North American Land title Co., 707 P. 2d 
1105 (Mont. 1985); First National Bank of Meeker v. Theos, 794 P.2d 
1055 (Colo. App. 1990); First Bank of Wakeeney v. Moden, 681 P.2d 
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11, 13 (Kan. 1984) . The Utah Supreme Court has imposed a difficult 
standard for finding a fiduciary relationship, stating that the 
involvement must be so drastic that the dependent party is unable 
to substitute his will for the party providing the guidance. Von 
Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1985). 
Many cases have held, on facts involving a much greater 
relationship than those alleged in this case, that there is no 
confidential or fiduciary relationship between a bank and its 
borrower. Pulse v. North America Land Title Company, 707 P.2d 1105 
(Mont. 1985) (finding no fiduciary relationship notwithstanding 
that the customer had had accounts with the bank for approximately 
3 6 years, dealt with the loan department on a few occasions prior 
to the transaction in question, financed the purchase of their 
residence and a business with the bank, and had a few small loans 
insured by the Small Business Administration through that bank); 
First National Bank of Meeker v. Theos, 794 P. 2d (Colo. App. 1990) 
(finding no confidential relationship notwithstanding the 
customer7s claim that he reposed a special trust and confidence in 
the bank as a result of 20 years of prior dealings, plus a long-
standing social relationship with the bank officer and receiving 
advice from the officer over the years); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 
P. 2d 766 (Utah 1985) (finding as a matter of law that no 
confidential relationship existed even though the customer was 82 
years old and distressed over the imminent sale of the ranch he had 
owned for 40 years). 
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The meager facts presented by the Defendants, which are not 
substantiated by the record, do not rise to the level of a 
fiduciary relationship as a matter of law. 
Finally, Defendants claim that State Bank was in a fiduciary 
relationship with Troy Hygro because it is the trustee on the Deeds 
of Trust securing the loans. This theory is flawed for two 
reasons. First of all, Defendants cite no authority which would 
obligate a trustee under a trust deed to a fiduciary obligation in 
its general dealings with the borrower. State Bank has been unable 
to find any Utah cases which even address such a proposition. 
Secondly, even if such a fiduciary relationship exists, the claims 
which the Defendants assert do not relate in any way to the trust 
deeds. They relate to other general dealings between the parties 
and not to the specific property or loans which the Defendants 
claim were improper. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE RULING 
OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR AND THUS THE RULING OF 
THE TRIAL COURT MUST BE UPHELD 
The main argument made by the Defendants on appeal is that the 
trial court improperly ruled that the statute of limitations barred 
their affirmative defenses. Because the Defendants' arguments are 
not specific, their Brief gives the impression that all of the 
counterclaims were also raised as affirmative defenses. In 
reality, the Defendants only raised four claims in opposition to 
State Bank's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R-0666-0675 
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(Appellants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment)). The four claims are: (1) failure to 
fund the $325,000 when processed; (2) economic duress; (3) 
negligent structuring and disbursal; and (4) breach of duties of 
good faith and fair dealing and control and self dealing. Of the 
four claims, two were not plead as affirmative defenses and should 
not be considered as such. Each will be discussed in detail below. 
Defendants have completely failed to point to specific 
evidence in the record that raises a material issue of fact as to 
any of their affirmative defenses. Instead, Defendants have 
deceptively combined all of the court's numerous rulings into one 
argument which focuses entirely on their view of the law, while 
brushing aside the facts. Defendants' shotgun approach 
inaccurately portrays the trial court's October 9, 1992 ruling 
(which addressed the affirmative defenses) as one that hinged 
completely on the court's supposed finding that all of Defendants' 
defenses were barred by the statute of limitations. In doing so, 
Defendants have selectively chosen not to discuss the full factual 
basis for the court's ruling. And, as to the poorly supported 
facts which they state in their Brief, they fail to show how they 
are material. The Appellants have the duty to marshall the facts, 
and show the error of the trial court's ruling. Marchant v. Park 
City, supra, at 682. The Defendants have not done so and the 
dismissal of their affirmative defenses must be upheld. 
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POINT III 
ALL DEFENSES RELATING TO THE 1985 LOAN AND THE 1987 LOAN WERE 
PROPERLY BARRED 
The first and third arguments asserted by the Defendants in 
their Memorandum regarding the affirmative defenses duplicate the 
arguments made in the counterclaim that State Bank breached a 
contract to fund the $325,000 loan when SBA approval was granted, 
and that it negligently and improperly structured and disbursed the 
two loans. First of all, these two claims were never plead as 
affirmative defenses and thus should not even be considered. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 8 requires that all affirmative defenses be raised in 
the pleadings. Defendants have never sought to amend their answer 
to assert these claims as affirmative defenses, and they should not 
be permitted to do so on appeal. See Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 
245, 248 (Utah 1983) (Rule 15, permitting amendment of pleading, to 
be applied with less liberality when amendments are proposed during 
or after trial, rather than before trial). 
However, even if this Court chooses to consider these claims 
as if they had been properly raised as affirmative defenses, the 
trial court's order granting judgment to State Bank over the 
affirmative defenses must be upheld, both because the claims are 
barred by the statute of limitations and because the Appellants 
have not established a prima facie case as a matter of law. 
Even though it may be true that statutes of limitation 
generally do not apply to defenses raised by a party, it is not 
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true that all so-called "defenses" are equally shielded from 
applicable statutes of limitation. There are many instances when 
"defenses" are or should be dismissed because the basis for the 
claim is barred by a statute of limitation. 
In this case, once the trial court determined that Defendants' 
claims relating to the October 1985 loan and the February 1987 loan 
were barred by the statute of limitations (discussed in detail 
above under Point I), it properly refused to consider any of those 
claims to be viable defenses to Plaintiff's Complaint. The general 
rules cited by Defendants regarding the application of statutes of 
limitation to defenses are inapplicable in this case. 
A. Claims Barred by Statutes of Limitation Cannot be Brought 
as a Direct Action or as a Defense Under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-44. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 expressly precludes the use of 
claims that are barred by the statute of limitations as affirmative 
defenses. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 (1992) states: 
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the 
principal or interest shall have been paid, or an 
acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, 
or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an 
action may be brought within the period prescribed for 
the same after such payment, acknowledgment or promise; 
but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, 
signed by the party to be charged thereby. When a right 
of action is barred by the provisions of any statute, it 
shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or 
ground of defense. (Emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court construed the last sentence of § 78-12-
44 as follows: "[A] reasonable interpretation of the last sentence 
of this statute would compel the conclusion that any statute which 
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bars a right of action is conclusive unless its operation is 
suspended by the specific provisions of § 78-12-44." Yergensen v. 
Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d 696, 697 (1965) (emphasis added). 
According to the plain language of the last sentence of § 78-
12-44 and the yergrensen court's interpretation, this statute is 
squarely controlling. The trial court's ruling on the statute of 
limitations issues is conclusive because in this case none of the 
provisions of § 78-12-44 suspended the operation of the statute of 
limitations. Defendants' claims are barred by the statutes of 
limitation, and thus are unavailable either as a cause of action or 
ground of defense. 
Defendants incorrectly assume, without authority, that § 78-
12-44 was enacted only to cover situations involving the effect of 
acknowledgments of liability or part payment on the tolling of the 
statutes of limitation. As the Yergensen court made clear, the 
provisions of the last sentence are applicable in all cases in 
which a statute bars a right of action unless the other provisions 
of the section suspend such an effect. In this case, no such 
suspension took place, meaning the trial court's ruling remained 
conclusive. 
Defendants also inaccurately argue that their defenses were 
barred wholly because of the court's reliance on § 78-12-44. While 
it is true that Plaintiff argued that such should be the case, the 
court never affirmatively based its ruling on § 78-12-44. Rather, 
as was previously noted, the trial court concluded that summary 
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judgment was justified as to Plaintiff's first and second claims 
for relief because "no material issues [existed] with respect to 
the October 7, 1985 transaction." (R-699 (November 13, 1992 Order, 
f 1)). Even if the trial court would have relied solely on § 78-
12-44 in dismissing all of Defendants7 claims and defenses relating 
to the 1985 transaction, the court's decision would have been well 
grounded in the law. 
B. The Alleged Breach of the Commitment to Fund the October 
1985 Loan Did Not Grow Out of the Transaction or 
Occurrence Sued Upon. 
A defense is only shielded from the effects of a statute of 
limitations when the defense "arises out of the transaction sued 
upon." Allis-Chalmers v. North Bonneville, 775 P.2d 953, 955 
(Wash. 1989). In delineating the circumstances under which a cause 
of action should be considered to "arise out of" or "grow out of" 
a transaction or occurrence, the Utah Supreme Court has declared 
that "a cause of action is founded upon an instrument in writing 
when the contract, obligation, or liability grows out of the 
written instrument, not remotely or ultimately, but immediately." 
Evans v. Pickett Bros. Farms, 17 Utah 2d 375, 499 P. 2d 273, 274 
(1972) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court has stated: 
"
xBut the cause of action is not upon a contract founded upon 
an instrument in writing, within the meaning of the Code, 
merely because it is in some way remotely or indirectly 
connected with such an instrument, or because the instrument 
would be a link in the chain of evidence establishing the 
cause of action. In order to be founded upon an instrument in 
writing, the instrument must itself contain a contract to do 
the thing for the nonperformance of which the action is 
brought.'" 
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Petty & Riddle v. Lunt, 104 Utah 130, 138 P.2d 648, 651 (1942) 
(quoting Patterson v. Doe, 62 P. 569, 570 (Cal. 1900)). 
Applying the foregoing principals to the present action, 
Defendants' defenses clearly do not arise immediately out of the 
loan transactions that form the basis for Plaintiff's claims and, 
therefore, are subject to the applicable statute of limitations. 
The loan documents contain no provision requiring Plaintiffs to 
fund the $325,000 loan when SBA approval was granted. 
The trial court properly concluded that the October 7, 1985 
loan documents and the alleged oral contract were independent 
agreements when it dismissed Defendants' counterclaims. (R-491a-
492 (July 9, 1992 Order)). Defendants were actually seeking 
affirmative relief for alleged harms arising out of a separate and 
independent oral contract; that is, an alleged contract to make a 
loan at a specific time. All counterclaims relating to the 
separate alleged agreement were properly barred as defenses by the 
statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts. 
It would take a considerable stretch to conclude that 
Defendants' claims arose out of the loan agreement. Nothing in the 
written agreement confirms or gives effect to the oral dealings of 
the parties. There is clearly no merger of the two separate causes 
of action and the issues surrounding the alleged oral contract are 
immaterial to the validity of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
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C. Each of Defendants' claims Barred by the Statute of 
Limitations Was in Reality an Set Off, Not a Matter of 
"Pure Defense." 
Courts universally recognize that "in the absence of a statute 
to the contrary, a demand pleaded by way of setoff, counterclaim or 
cross-claim is regarded as an affirmative action in most 
jurisdictions, and therefore, unlike a matter of pure defense, is 
subject to the operation of the statute of limitations." Rochester 
American Ins. co. v. Cassel Truck Lines, 402 P.2d 782, 786 (Kan. 
1965); see also Franciso v. Francisco, 191 P.2d 317, 320 (Mont. 
1948); Jewell v. Compton, 559 P.2d 874, 875-76 (Oregon 1977). "Set 
off" or "counterclaim" are defined as "a demand which the defendant 
has against the plaintiff arising out of a transaction extrinsic to 
the plaintiff's cause of action. . . . " Morris v. Achen Const* 
Co., Inc., 747 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) reversed in 
part on other grounds, 747 P.2d 1211 (Ariz. 1986) (citing Blackfs 
Law Dictionary 1146 (5th ed. 1979)). 
Furthermore, according to the Utah Supreme Court, "[a]t law a 
party cannot use a matter as a set-off unless it is a legally 
subsisting cause of action in his favor and upon which he could 
maintain an independent action." Reeve v. Blatchley, 106 Utah 259, 
147 P.2d 861, 864 (1944). Similarly, in Arizona, if the defendant 
is not entitled to obtain relief in a direct action, the defendant 
cannot assert setoff or counterclaim. Occidental Chemical Co. v. 
Connor, 604 P.2d 605, 607 (Ariz. 1979). 
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In this case, each of Defendants' counterclaims and related 
affirmative defenses is offensive in nature rather than purely 
defensive. The Defendants are unquestionably seeking affirmative 
relief for their claims. The trial court, as a consequence, 
correctly treated Defendants' claims as set offs barred by the 
statute of limitations rather than pure defenses shielded from 
statute of limitations. Under Reeve, Defendants are not entitled 
to claim set offs when there is no legally subsisting cause of 
action to support their claims. Regardless of what Defendants 
attempt to label their claims, the claims are in reality set offs 
and as such were appropriately barred by the trial court on statute 
of limitations grounds. In discussing this exact issue, the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii stated: 
The proper standard to determine the relevant limitation 
period is the nature of the claim or right, not the form 
of the pleading. 
Au v. Au, supra, at 177 (emphasis added). 
The Defendants' reliance on Seattle First National Bank, N.A. 
v. Siebol, 824 P.2d 1252 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) for the notion that 
their counterclaims should have been treated as defenses, not 
subject to statutes of limitation, is unfounded. The facts in 
Siebol and in the present case are easily distinguishable. In 
Siebol the defendant explicitly asserted as a counterclaim that the 
bank breached an oral contract to loan him a specified amount of 
money. Id. at 1254. At the same time he asserted the breach as an 
affirmative defense. Id. 
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The trial court in Siebol concluded that the counterclaim was 
barred by the statute of limitations, but granted a setoff on the 
affirmative defense for lost profits on a theory of promissory 
estoppel. Id. After hearing testimony on the matter, the trial 
court specifically found that the plaintiff bank represented to 
defendant that he could obtain loans for a specified amount and 
that the defendant had relied on the plaintiff's assurances in 
opening a business. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the 
decision noting that some defenses are not barred by the statute of 
limitations as long as the defense arises out of the transaction 
sued upon, goes to the justice of the plaintiff's claim, and the 
main action itself is timely. Id. at 1255. The appeals court was 
convinced that there was substantial evidence to support the trial 
court's finding that equitable offset was warranted based on the 
principles of promissory estoppel. Id. at 1256. 
In the present case, unlike Siebol, there is no factual basis 
in the record to support a finding that any of Defendants' defenses 
are supported by substantial evidence. As was previously discussed 
under Point I, the alleged promises by State Bank were not clear 
and unambiguous as is required and there was no detrimental 
reliance by defendants. Further, Defendants' defenses do not arise 
out of the transaction sued upon. The promises made in Siebol were 
an integral part of the loan agreement between the parties which is 
not the case here. Finally, Defendants, unlike the defendant in 
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Siebol, did not raise their claims relating to the alleged oral 
promises as both affirmative defenses and counterclaims. 
Defendants further reliance on Jacobsen v. Bunker, 699 P.2d 
1208. 1210 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that a counterclaim can 
be set-off against the plaintiff's claim even though the 
defendant's claim is barred by a statute of limitations, is 
likewise inapplicable in this action. Jacobsen involved two 
sisters who each borrowed money from their father on promissory 
notes and who inherited shares of the balance remaining on each 
note after their father's death. The plaintiff brought an action 
against the defendant to recover the amount due. The defendant 
counterclaimed for the amount due on plaintiff's note. Id. at 
1209. Because the notes were executed and payable in California, 
California law governed the outcome of the case. Id. Yet, because 
no California law existed on the matter, the court presumed the 
California law was the same as Utah's. Id. 
The Supreme Court concluded that even though the defendants' 
counterclaim was barred by the statute of limitations, defendant 
could still offset against the amount owed the plaintiff. Id. at 
1210. The court relied upon Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13 (i) to 
support its conclusion. Rule 13 (i) provides: 
When cross demands have existed between persons under 
such circumstances that, if one had brought an action 
against the other, a counterclaim could have been set up, 
the two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as 
they equal each other, and neither can be deprived of the 
benefit thereof by the assignment or death of the other, 
except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule. 
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The Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power Co., 82 
Utah 607, 17 P.2d 281, 285 (1932) , interpreted Rule 13(i)'s 
predecessor (Section 6578, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, which is identical 
to the present version in all material respects). The Telluride 
court emphasized that in order for Rule 17 (i) to apply the two 
claims must be "coexistent and overlapping in point of time" or 
rather that both must be "subsisting claims before the statute of 
limitations has run against the other." 17 P. 2d 281, 285 (Utah 
1932); see also Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 99 Utah 240, 144 
P.2d 276, 284 (1943). 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that in this case Rule 
13 (i) is inapplicable to the October 1985 loan. Defendants' claims 
against Plaintiff for its alleged failure to timely loan Defendants 
the $325,000 did not "coexist or overlap" with Plaintiff's claims. 
Defendants' claims were barred by the statute of limitations before 
Defendants' breached the repayment obligation under the loan. The 
statute of limitations for the alleged failure to fund the $325,000 
loan expired on September 3, 1989. The Defendants didn't default 
under the $325,000 loan until February of 1990 (R-503 (third Fife 
Affid., f 12)). 
In addition to the foregoing, Rule 13 (i) should also be 
construed to require that the defendants' claim must arise out of 
the transaction or occurrence that forms the basis of the 
plaintiff's claim before a defendant can offset one claim against 
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a plaintiff's co-existing claim. Such requirement would wisely 
prevent defendants from being able to obtain offsets regardless of 
whether the counterclaim has long been barred by the statute of 
limitations or has any connection whatsoever with the plaintiff's 
claims for relief. See Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 P.2d 1, 13 
(Kan. 1977) (noting that "an outlawed claim may be used as a setoff 
if it (a) coexisted with the plaintiff's claim and (b) arises out 
of the xcontract or transaction' on which the plaintiff's claim is 
based.")-1 
D. The Defendants have not made a prima facie case on these 
Affirmative Defenses. 
Beyond the statute of limitations arguments, Appellants still 
have to prove a prima facie case to get past summary judgment. J. 
Henry Jones Co. v. Smith, 27 Utah 2d 225, 494 P.2d 526, 527 (1972) 
(defendant's claims of offset against stated purchase price were 
affirmative defenses upon which he has the burden of proof). The 
merits of these affirmative defenses are identical to their 
counterparts in the counterclaims and are discussed in detail under 
Point I, above. Whether as a counterclaim or as an affirmative 
defense, Appellants failed to prove their prima facie case at the 
trial court and the affirmative defenses must be overruled, as a 
1
 At one time, Utah and Kansas had essentially identical rules relating to co-existing claims. 
See Telluride Power Co., 17 P.2d at 285. Kansas eventually amended its rule to explicitly 
include a requirement that the outlawed claim coexisted with the plaintiffs claim and arose out 
the contract that formed the basis of the plaintiffs claim. Though Utah's Rule does not contain 
the express language Kansas's rule does, its should be construed as though it does. 
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matter of law, notwithstanding the statute of limitations issues. 
Because space is short, and because the issues are identical, 
Respondent will not repeat all of the argument and analysis on the 
failure of the Defendants to prove a prima facie case, but rather 
incorporates herein by reference the arguments set forth under 
Point I, above. 
POINT IV 
THE CLAIMS FOR ECONOMIC DURESS AND BREACH OF DUTIES OF 
GOOD FAITH, FAIR DEALING AND FIDUCIARY DUTY WERE DECIDED 
ON THE MERITS BY THE TRIAL COURT, AND THE APPELLANTS DID 
NOT MAKE THEIR CASE AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Because the Appellants' Brief is not issue specific, it gives 
the impression that all of the affirmative defenses were denied 
based on the statute of limitations. This is not the case. The 
second and fourth affirmative defenses argued by the Appellants in 
opposition to State Bank's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
those being economic duress and the alleged breach of duties of 
good faith, fair dealing and fiduciary responsibility, were 
dismissed on the merits. 
According to the trial court's July 9, 1992 Order, each of the 
corresponding claims in the Counterclaim was dismissed by the court 
on the merits because Defendants' failed to submit sufficient proof 
to sustain their claim. (R-0490-0495 (July 9, 1992 Order)). 
Similarly, in considering the same issues as affirmative 
defenses, the trial court properly concluded, after hearing and 
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reviewing the factual record before it, that the Appellants had not 
met their burden of proof: 
I really don't — you know, the same reasons that I ruled on 
the merits on the counterclaim I think are going to be 
applicable on the merits. At least some of those matters. 
The fair dealing, good faith and so forth, as defenses. And 
of course partial summary judgment can be granted with respect 
to a defense, either allowing it or excluding it. And I don't 
really see factual bases for those things anymore as a defense 
as I saw as an independent cause of action. 
(R-1262 (October 9, 1992 Hearing, p. 68, emphasis added)). 
Once again, because space is short, the merits of these two 
claims will not be repeated here. The issues are the same as they 
were in the counterclaims. The trial court ruled the same way, and 
this Court should uphold the trial court's ruling on these issues 
as affirmative defenses just as it should on the issues as 
counterclaims. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, State Bank respectfully requests 
that the decisions of the trial court be affirmed. State Bank 
should also be awarded costs and/or attorney's fees pursuant to 
Utah R. App. P. 3 3. 
DATED this day of December, 1993. 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
THOMAS M. HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH, 
a Utah Banking Corporation, 
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vs. 
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC., 
MICHAEL R. KEHL, GLORIA F. 
KEHL, DONALD K. KEHL, 
LENORE F. KEHL, KEITH KEHL, 
KAREN SUE KEHL and 
JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC., 
MICHAEL R. KEHL, GLORIA F. 
KEHL, LENORE F. KEHL, KEITH 
KEHL and KAREN SUE KEHL, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 900901153 
Judge Robert F. Owens 
0004SU 
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH, ) 
a Utah Banking Corporation, ) 
) 
Counterclaim Defendant. ) 
This matter came before the Court on Wednesday, June 24, 1992, on the Plaintiffs 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Counterclaim of the Defendants. The matter 
was heard by the Honorable Robert F. Owens, District Court Judge by assignment. The 
Plaintiff appeared by and through its attorney of record, Thomas M. Higbee, and the firm of 
Chamberlain & Higbee. The Defendants appeared by and through their attorney of record, 
Budge W. Call, BROWN & BROWN. The Court listened to the arguments of counsel, and 
reviewed the affidavits and discovery. Being fully advised in the premises; now therefore the 
Court enters its 
FINDINGS 
1. On or about October 7, 1985, State Bank of Southern Utah, a Utah banking 
corporation, granted a loan to Troy Hygro Systems, Inc., guaranteed by the other Defendants, 
in the amount of $325,000. 
2. The Defendants have alleged breaches in connection with the above-referenced loan. 
Specifically, the Defendants allege that State Bank failed to timely and properly grant the loan 
pursuant to a prior agreement to do so. 
3. The alleged breaches occurred on or about September 3, 1985, when the approval by 
the Small Business Administration was given to State Bank and State Bank did not advance the 
2 
000491 
funds. The statute of limitations for all claims relating to the Bank's failure to timely and 
properly grant the loan and disburse the funds accrued on September 3, 1985. 
4. The alleged breach of agreement to grant the $325,000 loan upon SBA approval, and 
all other claims relating to the $325,000 loan, are not founded on an instrument in writing. 
5. The actual loan granted October 7, 1985, is independent of the alleged obligation to 
grant a loan or to perform in any other way, prior to that date. Thus, the documents relating 
to the October 7, 1985, loan do not constitute a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of 
limitations as to anything that happened prior thereto. There is no merger of the two 
independent contracts. 
6. The transactions regarding the $325,000 loan, and the alleged breaches in connection 
therewith, are independent of the subsequent loans and dealings between the same parties. 
Therefore, nothing that happened after the alleged breaches relating to the $325,000 loan in 
October of 1985 could extend the accrual date for the statute of limitations relating thereto, and 
attempts to include these transactions with later transactions for the purposes of determining the 
commencement of the statute of limitations are not within the law. 
7. There is no unequivocal reaffirmation or repromise by State Bank subsequent to the 
alleged breaches in relation to the $325,000 loan. And, the Court finds that the doctrine of 
reaffirmation as relied on by the Defendants applies only to contracts for the payment of money 
or other liquidated obligations and thus is not applicable to the claims in this case. 
3 
8. On or about February 10, 1987, State Bank granted an additional loan to Troy Hygro, 
and the other Defendants as guarantors, in the amount of $60,000. The funds were fully 
disbursed on or before February 20, 1987. 
9. There is an issue of fact as to whether State Bank properly disbursed the funds from 
the February 10, 1987, loan, in the amount of $60,000. 
10. The claim regarding the failure of State Bank to properly disburse the funds from 
the February 10, 1987, loan, is founded upon an instrument in writing since it involves the issue 
of performance of the loan and obligations associated therewith, which are written. 
11. Therefore, the six-year statute of limitations regarding contracts founded upon 
instruments in writing applies to the breach of contract claim for the alleged failure to properly 
disburse the funds in connection with the February 10, 1987, loan. 
12. The claims for negligence, also relating to the disbursal of the February 10, 1987 
loan, are governed by the four-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence claims. The 
breach accrued on or before February 20, 1987, when the funds were fiilly disbursed. The 
applicable four-year statute of limitation regarding the negligence claims began running on that 
date. 
13. The Defendants' claims for breach of duty of good faith, and unauthorized control 
over the affairs of Troy Hygro, consist of three distinct and separate transactions, each related 
to the three loans at issue herein. The three loans are the $325,000 loan granted on October 7, 
1985, the $60,000 loan granted on February 10, 1987, and a loan in the amount of $49,000 
granted on or about November 9, 1988. 
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14. As to each separate claim for breach of duty of good faith and unauthorized control, 
the causes of action accrue, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the action was 
allegedly taken by the Bank and the alleged damage occurred. In each case, as relating to the 
three separate transactions here, the statute of limitations began to run when the respective loans 
were given. These claims for breach of duty of good faith and unauthorized control are 
governed by the applicable four-year statute of limitations. 
15. The claims for breach of duty of good faith, and improper control, are barred by 
the four-year statute of limitations as to the transactions relating to the October 1985 loan and 
the February 1987 loan, and the transactions associated therewith; The breaches of good faith 
and improper control are not barred by the statute of limitations for the loan of November, 1988, 
and the transactions associated therewith. 
16. However, the Defendants have not submitted sufficient proof to support a legal 
theory relating to the claims of improper control and breach of duty of good faith. The claims 
relating to improper control and breach of duty of good faith should therefore be dismissed, with 
prejudice, except that the dismissal shall be without prejudice insofar as it relates to the 
obligations of Keith Kehl, and the issue whether he was misled by Plaintiff to his damage in the 
papers he signed. 
17. The Defendants have also not submitted sufficient proof to sustain their claim for 
economic duress, as a matter of law, and all economic duress claims should therefore be 
dismissed. 
18. The Seventh Cause of Action should be dismissed upon stipulation of the parties. 
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The Court having entered its Findings; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that State Bank's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby granted in part and denied in part as follows: 
1. The Defendants' First Cause of Action should be and hereby is dismissed, with 
prejudice and on the merits, except for the Defendants' contract claims for wrongful 
disbursement of the February 10, 1987 loan in breach of the written contract, which are not 
dismissed. 
2. The Defendants' Second Cause of Action should be and hereby is dismissed, with 
prejudice and on the merits, in its entirety. 
3. The Defendants' Third Cause of Action should be and hereby is dismissed, with 
prejudice and on the merits, in its entirety. 
4. The Defendants' Fourth Cause of Action should be and hereby is dismissed, with 
prejudice and on the merits, in its entirety. 
5. The Defendants' Fifth Cause of Action should be and hereby is dismissed, with 
prejudice and on the merits, in its entirety; provided, however, that insofar as it relates to the 
liability of Keith Kehl, and the issue whether he was misled by the Plaintiff to his damage in the 
papers he signed, the dismissal is without prejudice. 
6. The Defendants' Sixth Cause of Action should be and hereby is dismissed, with 
prejudice and on the merits, in its entirety. 
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7. The Defendants' Seventh Cause of Action should be and hereby is dismissed, with 
prejudice and on the merits. 
DATED this / day of July, 1992. 
lOBERT F. OWMS 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of July, 1992, a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing ORDER was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to Budge W. Call, 
BROWN & BROWN, Attorney for Defendants, 505 East 200 South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102. 
Secretary A 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH 
a Utah Banking Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.; 
MICHAEL R, KEHL; GLORIA F. KEHL 
LEONORE F. KEHL; KEITH KEHL; 
KAREN SUE KEHL AND JOHN DOES 
1through 10, 
Defendants 
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.; 
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA F. KEHL 
LENORE F. KEHL; KEITH KEHL; 
KAREN SUE KEHL, 
Counterclaimants 
vs. 
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH 
a Utah Banking Corporation, 
Counterclaim 
Defendant 
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO PLAINTIFF ON COMPLAINT 
CASE NO. 900901153 
1 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the entire 
complaint (partial in the sense that issues remained on the 
counterclaim) was argued on^and taken under advisement. The 
court now rules as follows: \<f)cc ^  IQB2. 
1. Consistent with the findings in the previous order filed 
July 16, 1992, the court finds no material issues with respect to 
the October 7, 1985 transaction and grants summary judgment on 
the first and second claims for relief in the complaint, for the 
000893 
amounts claimed therein and set forth in plaintiff's motion for 
partial summary judgment dated August 13, 1992, except for the 
issue of attorney's fees, 
2. With respect to claims three and four, summary judgment 
is granted to plaintiff on all issues relating to the February 
10, 1987 loan except for the issues involving defendant's seventh 
defense, improper disbursement of loan funds, which will be 
tried, as well as the issue of attorney's fees. 
3. Summary judgment is granted to plaintiff on claims five, 
six, and seven, except for the issue of attorney's fees, 
Dated this I aJ of Nov is> 
ROBERT F. OWENS", Judge T5y Appointment 
Fifth District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of November, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the within and foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF ON COMPLAINT was mailed, 
first-class postage prepaid to Charles C. Brown, Jeffrey B. 
Brown, and Budge W. Call, BROWN & BROWN, Attorneys for Defendants 
and Counterclaimants, 505 East 200 South, Ste 400, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84102 AND Thomas Higbee, CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 250 South Main Street, P.O.Box 726, 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0726. Hand Delivered -td bt>th aHbrneys Cru 
the courtroom, Hall of JutHce* HiMldtru?) In Ced&r city 
^ drMU. 
Deputy Clerk 
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Jeffrey B. Brown (0457) 
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BROWN & BROWN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Counterclaimants 
City Centre I, Suite 401 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-5656 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH, 
a Utah Banking Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.; 
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA F. KEHL; 
LENORE F. KEHL; KEITH KEHL; 
KAREN SUE KEHL and JOHN DOES 
1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.; 
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA F. KEHL; 
LENORE F. KEHL; KEITH KEHL; 
KAREN SUE KEHL, 
Counterclaimants 
vs. 
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH, 
a Utah Banking Corporation, 
Counterclaim 
Defendant. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Case Number 90 0901153 
(RTfMllOOCtfS) 
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The defendants hereby answer and otherwise respond to 
plaintiff's complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim against the 
defendants upon which the relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Defendants respond to the numbered allegations of 
plaintiff's complaint as follows: 
1. In answering paragraph 1 of plaintiff's complaint 
defendants can neither confirm nor deny the allegations and 
therefore deny the same. 
2. In answering paragraph 2 defendants admit that 
Troy Hygro Systems, Inc. is a Wisconsin Corporation, but deny the 
remaining allegations. 
3. In answering paragraph 3 defendants admit that 
Michael R. Kehl, Gloria F. Kehl, Donald K. Kehl, Lenore F. Kehl, 
Keith Kehl and Karen Sue Kehl are individuals residing outside 
the State of Utah but deny the remaining allegations. 
4. In answering paragraph 4 defendants deny the same. 
5. In answering paragraph 5 defendants admit that 
Troy Hygro Systems, Inc. and Donald K. Kehl are owners of real 
property located in Utah but deny the remaining allegations. 
6. In answering paragraph 6 defendants deny the same. 
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7. In answering paragraphs 7 through 8 defendants 
deny the same. 
8. In answering paragraph 9 defendants admit that the 
terms and conditions of the alleged Note were modified and assert 
that said modifications were to material terms of the Note and 
were made subsequent to the execution of any alleged guarantees 
of the Note by the defendants, defendants deny the remaining 
allegations. 
9. In answering paragraphs 10 through 13 defendants 
deny the same. 
10. In answering paragraph 14, defendants incorporate 
their answers to paragraphs 1 through 13 above by reference. 
11. In answering paragraphs 15 through 19 defendants 
deny the same. 
12. In answering paragraph 20 defendants admit that 
this court does not have jurisdiction over property located in 
the State of Wisconsin, the defendants deny the remaining 
allegations. 
13. In answering paragraphs 21 through 38 defendants 
deny the same. 
1*4. In answering paragraph 39 defendants admit that 
the terms and conditions of the alleged Note were modified and 
assert that said modifications were material and subsequent to 
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the execution of any alleged guarantees on the loan by the 
defendants, defendants deny the remaining allegations. 
15. In answering paragraphs 40 through 42 defendants 
deny the same. 
16. In answer to paragraph 43, defendant's incorporate 
their answers to paragraphs 1 through 42 above by reference. 
17. In answering paragraphs 44 through 69 defendants 
deny the same. 
18. In answering paragraph 70, defendants incorporate 
their answers to paragraphs 1 through 69 above by reference. 
19. In answering paragraphs 71 through 108 defendants 
deny the same. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has modified or otherwise materially altered the 
alleged Promissory Notes and other loan documents making the same 
unenforceable. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
To the extent to the alleged Promissory Notes have not been 
paid, conditions precedent to any liability of the defendants 
have not been met by the plaintiff. 
oooioo 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
The alleged Promissory Notes executed by Defendants were 
pursuant to proper release and disbursement of loan proceeds by 
plaintiff, any alleged amount owing is a result of plaintiff's 
breach of those terms barring plaintiff from further recovery and 
foreclosure. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
The alleged Promissory Notes and guarantees are void for 
lack of/or failure of consideration. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
The defendants did not receive proper disbursement of the 
funds by plaintiff under the terms of the Promissory Notes and 
other loan documents. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrines of laches, 
waives and or estoppel. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Subsequent to Defendants1 alleged execution of the 
Guarantees, plaintiff materially modified the alleged Notes and 
other loan documents thereby releasing the defendants as alleged 
guarantors. 
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TENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff*s relationship with defendants rose to a fiduciary 
relationship, plaintiff breached its fiduciary duty with the 
defendants in execution of the Promissory Notes, Security 
Agreement, Guarantees and other loan documents. 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff breached its duty to deal with the defendants in 
good faith and with fair dealing. 
TWELFTH DEFENSE 
This court has no jurisdiction to order foreclosure on real 
property located in Wisconsin. 
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is precluded under Utah law from simultaneously 
foreclosing an all real and personal property. 
FOURTEENTH DEFENSE 
Defendants1 alleged execution of the loan documents was 
under economic duress as a result of plaintiff's actions. 
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FIFTEENTH DEFENSE 
As a result of plaintifffs actions the loan documents are 
unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray as follows: 
1. For an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint with 
prejudice. 
2. For an order awarding defendants their attorney's 
fees and costs. 
3. for an order awarding such relief as the court 
deems equitable in the premises. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Defendants Troy Hygro Systems, Inc. (Troy), Michael R. Kehl, 
Gloria F. Kehl, Donald K.Kehl, Lenore F. Kehl, Keith Kehl, and 
Karen Sue Kehl, hereby assert counterclaims against the 
plaintiff, State Bank of Southern Utah (State Bank) as follows: 
1. Plaintiff and counterdefendant State Bank of Southern 
Utah (State Bank) is a banking corporation organized under the 
laws of Utah, doing business in Iron County, Utah. 
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2. Defendant and counterclaimant Troy Hygro Systems, Inc. 
(Troy) is a corporation organized in Wisconsin currently doing 
business in Iron County Utah. 
3. Lee Fife is assistant Vice President and loan officer 
at State Bank and at all times relevant hereto was active in the 
Troy Hygro account with State Bank. 
4. Troy is in the business of growing and marketing a 
unique tomato. The tomato is grown in a greenhouse using a 
hydroponic growing system. Troy began operations in East Troy 
Wisconsin. In 1985 Troy looked to expand its operation in Utah 
and Colorado. 
5. In August of 19 85 to facilitate funding for the 
purchase of property, plant and equipment, in New Castle, Utah, a 
request was made to the SBA in Salt Lake City seeking the 
guarantee of a loan to be made to Troy Hygro by State Bank of 
Southern Utah in the amount of $325,000.00. 
6. It was imperative to Troy to receive the funds in 
August or early September, at the latest, so construction could 
start on the new facility and a tomato crop could be planted by 
early October to grow during the winter months. 
7. State Bank was aware of the time restrictions placed on 
Troy and committed to loan Troy the amount of $325,000.00 upon 
approval by the SBA. 
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8. In early September of 19 85 the SBA approved the loan in 
the amount of $325,000.00. 
9. After the SBA approved the loan, however, State Bank 
refused to make any disbursements to Troy as promised and it is 
believed that State Bank did not have the money to loan to Troy. 
10. State Bank requested that Jim Markell, an employee of 
Troy, to take the loan package, already approved by the SBA, and 
go down the street in Cedar City, Utah, and try to solicit it to 
other banks. 
11. During this time, Troy already had a contractor lined 
up to commence with construction so that the facilities could be 
completed and a tomato crop planted for the winter growing 
season. However, because no disbursements were or could be made 
by State Bank as promised the construction had to be put on hold. 
12. To obtain money for the initial disbursement of the 
$325,000 loan, State Bank had to sell the loan in the secondary 
market which created a further delay. It is believed that the 
funds provided to Troy actually came from the sale on the 
secondary market. 
13. Defendant Troy to its detriment relied upon State 
Bank's promise and commitment to provide the necessary funds upon 
approval of the loan by the SBA. 
9 
000103 
14. State Bank finally made an initial disbursement on the 
loan in October 19 85. However, because of the delay construction 
took place in the winter months and went longer than expected and 
as a result was more costly. As a result of the increased 
expenses and the late tomato crop Troy was placed in a financial 
bind. 
15. Because of the additional expenses and crop delays an 
additional $60,000 was necessary to complete the project. 
16. State Bank knowing the financial position and hardship 
of Troy as a result of the delays and actions of the Bank, 
solicited an extra loan for $60,000.00 to Troy in order to 
complete the original project. 
17. In order to obtain the necessary $60,000.00 State Bank 
not only required Troy and the defendants to execute a Note in 
the sum of $60,000.00, but further required additional security 
and guarantees from the defendants on the original loan. 
18. As a result of State Bank's failure to disburse the 
necessary money as previously committed Troy was in need of 
additional funds to complete the project. State Bank continued 
to solicit loans from the defendants and sought additional 
guarantees from the defendants. 
19. In November of 19 88, subsequent to the guarantees 
executed by the defendants, State Bank altered the material terms 
10 
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of the loan documents, including the terms of the Note for 
$325,000.00 and the terms of the Note for $60,000.00. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Breach of Agreement to Fund 
20. Defendants hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 19 
above herein by this reference. 
21. Through out the course of Troyfs dealing with State 
Bank, State Bank made various promises and commitments to Troy 
and the defendants, including but not limited to the promise to 
loan $325,000.00 upon approval of the SBA. 
22. State Bank wrongfully breached its promises to the 
damage and detriment of the defendant Troy in an amount to be 
proven at trial. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Willful Breach of Contract and Economic Duress 
23. Defendants hereby incorporate the allegations in 
paragraphs 1 through 22 above herein by this reference. 
24. Through out the course of Troy's dealing with State 
Bank, State Bank made various promises to and commitments with 
Troy and the defendants, including but not limited to the 
commitment to provide a construction loan of $325,000.00 upon 
approval by the SBA. State Bank knew or should have known that 
Troy and the defendants would reasonably rely upon these promises 
and change their position as result of said promises. 
11 
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25. Troy and the defendants did reasonable and justifiable 
rely upon the promises of State Bank and changed their position. 
The defendants based upon the commitment of State Bank placed 
themselves in a position where they relied completely on State 
Bank to do what it promised to do and had no reasonable 
alternatives but to rely on State Bank to perform its promises. 
26. State Bank new or should have known of this reliance by 
Troy and the other defendants or State Bank was reckless knowing 
that defendants were without reasonable alternatives but to 
accept the dictates and demands of State Bank. State Bank 
willfully breached its agreements with the defendants and 
willfully placed additional demands and requirements on the 
defendants knowing the defendants had no alternative but to agree 
to any new change or demand placed upon them. These arrangements 
placed the defendants in economic duress where they had to either 
accept the proposal, dictates and demands made by State Bank or 
lose the project all together. 
27. As a result of the willful breaches committed by the 
bank and economic duress placed upon the defendants the 
defendants had no choice but to execute additional Trust Deeds, 
personal guarantees, mortgages and other guarantees as the bank 
dictated. 
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28. As a result of the willful breaches committed by State 
Bank and economic duress placed upon the defendants, Troy and the 
defendants are entitled to a cancellation of the documents not 
consistent with their claims herein and an award of damages to be 
proven at trial, 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Promissory Estoppel 
29. Defendants hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 28 
above herein by this reference. 
30. Through out the course of Troy's dealing with State 
Bank, the Bank made various promises to Troy and the defendants 
as set forth above. 
31. State Bank knew or should have known that Troy and the 
other defendants would reasonably rely upon these promises and 
change their position as a result of said promises. 
32. In fact defendants in reasonable and justifiable 
reliance upon the promises of State Bank did substantially change 
their position and committed themselves to State Bank to provide 
funds to develop the project. 
33. After Troy and the defendants changed their position 
and were in a position of total reliance upon the dictates of 
State Bank to fund the project, State Bank breached its promises 
with Troy and the defendants and repeatedly placed additional 
restrictions and conditions on the financing and required the 
13 
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defendants to loan an additional amount from the Bank and execute 
additional guarantees all to the detriment and damage of the 
project and the defendants in an amount to be proven at trial. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Negligent Structuring and Disbursal 
34. Defendants hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 33 
above herein by this reference. 
35. State Bank had a duty to use good faith and due care in 
processing, structuring and in the disbursal of the financing, 
especially in light of the fact that State Bank was aware of the 
time constraints placed upon the project. 
36. The Bank wrongfully or negligently processed, 
structured and disbursed the funds to Troy and the defendants. 
37. The actions of State Bank and the problems experienced 
by the project bare out the fact that State Bank failed to 
properly disburse the funds when committed and placed the project 
in financial straits. 
38. State Bank has breached its obligation to properly 
process, structure, and disburse funds under the loan commitment 
to the proximate damage of Troy and the other defendants in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
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FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Control and Self Dealing 
39. Defendants hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 38 
above herein by this reference. 
40. As a result of the actions and conduct of State Bank, 
the Bank exercised such a degree of control over the project and 
the decisions of the parties that in fact the bank acted as a 
principal in the project. 
41. In relation thereto State Bank at all times acted in 
its own self interest on the project and contrary to interest of 
Troy and the other defendants. 
42. Such actions have resulted in damage to Troy and the 
other defendants in an amount to be proven at trial. 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Breach of Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
43. Defendants hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 42 
above herein by this reference. 
44. Under the circumstances as set forth above, State Bank 
in its dealings had the general duty of good faith and fair 
dealing to the defendants. 
45. The Bank breached its duties and as a result Troy and 
the other defendants have been damaged in an amount to be proven 
at trial. 
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SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Accounting, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
46. Defendants hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 45 
above herein by this reference. 
47. Defendants are entitled to full and complete accounting 
from State Bank of all transactions complained of herein and to 
declaratory relief against the Bank construing the rights and 
obligations of the parties herein to the documents and other 
agreements among the parties, in light of the breaches, 
misrepresentations and omissions of the Bank set forth herein. 
48. Defendants are further entitled to injunctive relief 
against the Bank in order to prevent irreparable injury to the 
project and a loss of the project and the land, preventing the 
Bank from attempting to foreclose or enforce any such documents 
until the matters herein can be fully adjudicated. 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray on their counterclaim, that they 
be awarded damages in an amount to be proven at trial, that the 
court construe all documents between the parties as requested by 
the defendants and the court cancel the documents not consistent 
with the claims of the defendants herein and that the court grant 
an injunction preventing the plaintiff from seeking foreclosure 
or to enforce any of the documents until the rights of the 
parties heretofore are fully adjudicated, for attorneys fees and 
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costs, and for such other and further relief as a court deems 
just and equitable in the premises. 
DATED this :?/ day of May, 1991. 
BROWN & BROWN 
udge W/ C a l l 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ day o5^ Ma-y, 1991, I 
caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM to: 
Thomas M. Higbee 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
250 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
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example in' Mottern v. State (1984), Ind. 
App., 466 N.E.2d 488, the First District, 
finding no evidence of prejudice at all stat-
ed: 
"On the other hand, the state offered no 
evidence of prejudice such as unavailabil-
ity of its witnesses, records, test results, 
or any other reason why it would be 
impossible or extremely difficult to 
present its case against Mottern at this 
time". 
However, the issue has not been so clearly 
presented as it has been in the case at bar. 
Laches has been firmly engrafted upon the 
post-conviction rule, as a broad equitable 
doctrine, however it is in an evolutionary 
stage in this context. 
Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 
Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2254 enacted by 
Congress in 1976 incorporates the doctrine 
of laches into the law governing habeas 
corpus cases for the federal courts. It 
provides: 
A petition may be dismissed if it appears 
that the state of which the respondent is 
an officer has been prejudiced in its abili-
ty to respond to the petition by delay in 
iUj filing unless the petitioner shows that 
it is based on ground of which he could 
not have had knowledge by the exercise 
of reasonable diligence before the cir-
cumstances prejudicial to the state oc-
curred. 
Federal law is important in our considera-
tions in this appeal, because it should gov-
ern this State when it decides whether or 
not to afford redress for a federal constitu-
tional wrong, which this constitutionally in-
valid plea surely involves. 
Prior to 1976 long delay in bringing a 
postconviction claim to a federal court 
merely increased the burden on a petition-
er. Congress in enacting Rule 9(a) took 
the same step this court took in Twyman v. 
State, supra, and placed the burden on the 
prosecutorial authorities to prove laches. 
The elements of laches in both state and 
federal courts are essentially the same: un-
reasonable delay by the petitioner and prej-
udice from that delay. However, the posi-
tion of Congress is that the component of 
prejudice involves predudice to the state in 
its ability to meet the allegations of the 
post-conviction petition and not prejudice to 
the state in its ability to successfully retry 
the petitioner in the event post-conviction 
relief is granted. Aiken v. Spalding (9th 
Cir.1982), 684 F.2d 632, cert, denied, 460 
U.S. 1093, 103 S.Ct. 1795, 76 L.Ed.2d 361 
(1983). Chief Justice Burger, speaking for 
himself alone, has suggested in a separate 
statement to the denial of certiorari in the 
Aiken case that Congress amend rule 9(a) 
to permit prejudice to the ability of the 
state to retry the petitioner successfully to 
be made material to the question of delay 
prejudice. Congress has been reluctant in 
the past to deal with this question more 
harshly. 
In this appeal the question is presented 
in a pristine form. The constitutionally 
infirm character of the plea and conviction 
is clear. That plea and conviction support* 
appellant's enhanced sentence which he is 
now serving for his more recent crime. 
While we have said many times that the 
enhancement of this newer sentence is not 
a new and additional punishment for the 
old crime; yet we know also that if this 
infirm plea and conviction is permitted to 
stand, appellant ".. in effect suffers anew 
from the deprivation .." of his constitu-
tional rights. Burgett v. Texas (1967), 389 
U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319. At 
this high level of judicial concern, and with-
in this area of delayed claims, prejudice to 
the State's retrial capabilities should be 
declared insufficient. 
GIVAN, C.J., and PIVARNIK, SHEP-
ARD and DICKSON, JJ., vote to den/ 
transfer. 
DeBRULER, J., dissents to the denial of 
transfer with opinion. 
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SECURITY BANK & TRUST CO.. Appel-
lant (Plaintlff-Counter-defendant), 
v. 
Francla H. BOGARD. Appellee 
(Defendant-Counter-plaintiiT). 
No. 4-985A246. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana, 
Fourth District. 
June 30, 1986. 
Bank brought action against farmer on 
seven promissory notes, and farmer coun-
terclaimed alleging breach of contract to 
provide loan and promissory estoppel. The 
Superior Court, Vigo County. Division I, 
Michael H. Eldred, J., entered judgment for 
bank on promissory notes and for farmer 
on counterclaim. Bank appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Miller, J., held that: (1) 
bank's alleged agreement to extend credit 
to farmer who was not legally bound to 
borrow money from bank lacked mutuality 
of obligation and, therefore, was unen-
forceable, and (2) statement by bank em-
ployee that he would take loan application 
to committee and that bank would soon 
have something for farmer was statement 
of intention and statement of prediction, 
and therefore, not a promise for purposes 
of promissory estoppel. 
Reversed. 
Conover, J., dissented and filed opin-
ion. 
1. Contract* <**1(X6) 
Bank's alleged agreement to extend 
credit to farmer who was not legally bound 
to borrow money from bank lacked mutual-
ity of obligation and, therefore, was unen-
forceable. 
2. Ettoppel $=»85 
Doctrine of promissory estoppel re-
quires promise which reasonably induces 
action or forbearance of definite and sub-
stantial character, and which needs to be 
enforced in order to avoid injustice. 
3. Estoppel «=85 
Mere expression of intention is not 
"promise" for purpose of doctrine of prom-
issory estoppel or formation of contract 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Estoppel ^ 8 5 
Prediction, opinion, or prophecy is not 
"promise" for purpose of doctrine of prom-
issory estoppel or formation of contract. 
5. Estoppel «=»85 
Statement by bank's employee that he 
would take loan application "to the loan 
committee and within two or three days, 
we ought to have something here, ready 
for you to go with" was expression of 
intention to take application to loan com-
mittee and also contained prediction of ap-
proval and, therefore, did not contain any 
"promise" as required for application of 
doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
H. Brent Stuckey, Hart, Bell Deem, Ew-
ing & Stuckey, Vincennes, for appellant. 
Dennis R. Majewski, Terre Haute, for 
appellee. 
MILLER, Judge. 
Security Bank & Trust Co. sued Francis 
Bogard because he was in default on seven 
promissory notes. Bogard counterclaimed, 
alleging Security caused the default be-
cause it agreed to a loan for his farming 
operations and then refused to lend him 
any money. The trial court granted judg-
ment to Security on the defaulted notes 
and to Bogard on his counterclaim for dam-
ages. Security appeals, challenging the tri-
al court's conclusion that it was liable to 
Bogard either for breach of contract or 
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
We reverse. 
FACTS 
Security is a banking institution with its 
principal place of business in Vincennes, 
Indiana and a branch in Oaktown, Indiana. 
Bogard, a farmer in Sullivan County, had 
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done business with Security since 1949. In 
the spring of each crop season, Bogard 
established a line of credit at Security 
which would advance money to Bogard for 
the payment of production expenses. Al-
though repayment was to be made at har-
vest time, the notes were carried over 
many of the years because Bogard was 
unable to repay them. 
Bogard's loans did not require approval 
by the loan committee of the bank for the 
first twenty or twenty-five years of their 
banking relationship. For the last eight or 
nine years, however, Bogard was aware his 
jredit lines had to be approved by a loan 
committee in Vincennes at the main branch. 
Nevertheless, Bogard claimed that the pre 
vious Oaktown branch manager, Bruce Ma-
yall, told him the loan committee acted 
upon his recommendation so that Bogard 
concluded the loan committee approval was 
simply a formality. 
1981 and 1982 were two years of losses 
for Bogard. In 1982, Bogard was unable 
to pay his indebtedness for the year plus 
his carryover from the 1981 losses. At the 
conclusion of the 1982 crop season, Bogard 
continued to owe Security in excess of $28,-
000. 
Bogard began negotiating with Michael 
Chestnut, the Oaktown Security branch 
manager, in January of 1983 to obtain fi-
nancing for the 1983 crop year. Chestnut 
informed Bogard that Security would need 
additional collateral to secure the past in-
debtedness and the 1983 credit line because 
of the carryover losses from 1981 and 1982. 
In March, Chestnut and Bogard began dis-
cussing the possibility of real estate as a 
collateral for the loan. The two discussed 
the possibility of a mortgage on twenty-
five acres of Bogard's farm land or his 
house and four acres. After the bank as-
sistant took pictures of the property, Chest-
nut suggested a value of $1,500 per acre on 
the 25 acres of farm land for the security 
on the loan. In Bogard's words, Chestnut 
said, "Well, I'll take this to the loan com-
mittee and within two or three days, we 
ought to have something here, ready for 
you to go with." Record, pp. 124-25. 
Chestnut later informed Bogard that the 
loan committee turned down the twenty, 
five acres as insufficient security. He in-
formed Bogard that Security wanted the 
additional security of a first mortgage on 
the house and four acres, a second mort-
gage on the remainder of his farm, and a 
first mortgage on his crops and equipment 
Bogard was unwilling to comply with these 
terms. 
Meanwhile, Bogard attempted to secure 
financing elsewhere. The FHA turned him 
down because he was not the sole operator 
of his own farm. He was also rejected by 
First National Bank of Terre Haute be-
cause he had three consecutive losses in hU 
farming operations. 
On July 15, 1983, Security sued Bogard 
because he was in default on seven differ-
ent promissory notes totalling $29,982.72. 
Bogard counterclaimed, alleging Security 
agreed to extend him credit so that he 
could carry on his farming operations. He 
claimed that as a result of Security's fail-
ure to fulfill the promise, he was damaged 
as a result, including his failure to pay the 
defaulted notes. To support his claim of 
damages, Bogard testified that based on 
Security's representation, he had arranged 
to rent two hundred and fifty acres of 
soybean land, forty acres of additional wat-
ermelon ground, and equipment, all of 
which fell through due to lack of financing. 
He later admitted, however, that the rea-
son he did not obtain the two hundred and 
fifty acres of soybean land was that the 
owner had previously rented the land for a 
two year period to another tenant the year 
before. 
The trial court entered judgment for Se-
curity on its claim and Bogard on his coun-
terclaim, and entered the following find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law: 
"FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff/bank and Defend-
ant/counterplaintiff/Bogard had en-
gaged in a course of doing business since 
1949. 
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2. That such business consisted of the 
bank loaning Bogard money to operate 
his farm in the coming year. 
3. That from year to year Bogard 
paid his notes one year late, paying only 
current interest and then the principal 
the following year from that year's farm 
income. 
4. That the parties had continued this 
practice for a number of years, perhaps 
as long as 35 years. 
5. That by the admission of the 
bank's loan officer, Mike Chestnut, Bo-
gard had been a "good customer". 
6. That plaintiff had agreed to extend 
credit to Bogard for the farming year 
1982. 
7. That in 1982, without notice to Bo-
gard, the bank decided not to extend said 
credit citing a change in bank policy as 
the reason. 
8. That in disregard of prior practice 
and the regular course of business the 
plaintiff decided to enforce the terms of 
the notes as written. 
9. That under the strict terms of the 
notes Bogard was in default 
10. That as a result of plaintiffs deni-
al of credit for the farming year 1982, 
Bogard was unable to plant crops to 
make income and thus was unable to 
make any payments on the notes. 
11. That as a result of the denial of 
credit for the year 1982, Bogard lost 
projected profits from the sale of soy-
beans, grain and watermelons. 
12. That Bogard, in reliance of the 
promise of plaintiff, to extend credit and 
in reliance of his prior course of doing 
business with plaintiff entered into con-
tracts and agreements with third parites 
[sic] to his detriment and damage. 
I. As Security notes In Us brief, conclusions of 
law 2 and 3-—that the parties had modified the 
terms of the notes and that strict performance 
was waived by Security—are irrelevant conclu-
sions because the trial court concluded that Bo-
gard was in default and that Security should 
have judgment on the notes. Moreover, Bogard 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiff caused in whole or 
part defendant's breach on the notes. 
2. By their actions over a large num-
ger (sic) of years, and by oral modifica-
tion, the parties modified the terms of 
the notes sued upon so that any party 
seeking a change could not do so unilat-
erally. 
3. Strict performance of the terms of 
the notes was waived by plaintiff be-
cause their acts showed a relinquishment 
of several provisions of the notes. 
JUDGMENT 
It is hereby ordered that Defendant is 
in default on the notes sued upon and 
that Plaintiff shall have judgment as 
prayed. 
It is further ordered that Defend-
ant/counterclaimant have judgment on 
his counterclaim due to Plaintiff/coun-
terdefendant bank's breach of contract. 
Counterplaintiff has shown extensive 
damages, and the Court grants counter-
plaintiff judgment thereon, however, in 
the interests of justice and based upon 
the vicissitudes and speculative nature of 
farming income the Court grants judg-
ment to counterplaintiff only to the ex-
tent that those damages offset the dam-
ages of Plaintiff. The Court thus finds 
both judgments are satisfied. 
Costs to Plaintiff." 
Record, pp. 75-76.1 
Security appeals, challenging the suffi-
ciency of the evidence in four areas of the 
trial court's findings and conclusions: 
(1) That Security entered into a binding 
contract to extend Bogard credit for the 
1983 crop year; 
(2) That Security is liable on the basis of 
promissory estoppel; 
does not appeal the propriety of granting Secur-
ity judgment on the defaulted notes so we need 
not consider any apparent conflict between the 
trial court's conclusions and the judgment with 
respect to Security's claim on the defaulted 
notes. 
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(3) That Chestnut, the branch manager, 
had apparent authority to bind Security to 
provide the line of credit for the 1983 crop 
year; and 
(4) That Bogard's damages equaled the 
amount he owed Security on the defaulted 
notes. 
We reach no consideration on the issue of 
Chestnut's apparent authority or the 
court's novel and innovative computation of 
Bogard's alleged damages because we find 
Security is not liable under the theory of 
breach of contract or of promissory estop-
pel. 
DECISION 
The crux of Security's first two issues— 
whether there was a breach of contract or 
promissory estoppel—centers on the trial 
court's findings of fact 6 and 12 and con-
clusion of law 1: that Security agreed to 
extend Bogard credit for the 1983 farm 
year; * that in reliance on Security's prom-
ise to extend him credit, Bogard entered 
into contracts and agreements with third 
parties to his detriment and damage; and 
that Security caused in whole or in part 
Bogard's breach on the notes. Because 
Security and Bogard are unsure of the 
exact theory the trial court used to arrive 
at its conclusion that Security was liable 
for Bogard's damages—either because Se-
curity entered into a valid contract with 
Bogard to extend him credit which it then 
breached or because it was liable upon the 
theory of promissory estoppel—we will ad-
dress both issues. 
Enforceability of Contract 
[1] A fundamental concept of contract 
law is that a contract is unenforceable if it 
lacks mutuality of obligation—i.e., if it fails 
to obligate the parties to do anything. 
Seco Chemicals, Inc. v. Stewart (1976), 169 
Ind.App. 624, 349 N.E.2d 733. The general 
rule is explained as follows: 
"Mutuality of obligation is essential to 
the validity of an executory bilateral con-
tract which is based solely on mutual 
2. The findings of fact erroneously identify 1982 
as the year of the dispute between Bogard and 
Security. The record reveals and the parties 
promises or covenants and unless both 
parties are legally bound, so that each 
may hold the other liable for its breach, 
the contract lacks mutuality and neither 
party its bound. Thus, mutuality is ab-
sent when only one of the contracting 
parties is bound to perform, and the oth-
er party remains entirely free to choost 
whether or not to perform, and the 
rights of the parties exist at the option of 
one only." 
17 C.J.S. Contracts § 100(1X1963). 
Wvrv, Bogard was not legally bound to 
borrow the money from Security. In fact, 
Bogard testified he unsuccessfully attempt-
ed to seek financing elsewhere in lieu of 
obtaining a loan from Security. Because 
Bogard had no obligation to obtain his fi-
nancing from Security, any alleged con-
tract between Security and Bogard lacked 
mutuality of obligation and was thus unen-
forceable. 
Promissory Estoppel 
[2) Bogard also attempts to justify the 
trial court's judgment on the theory of 
promissory estoppel. While it is true that 
an otherwise unenforceable promise may 
be enforced under the doctrine of promisso-
ry estoppel, it is crucial to the promisee's 
cause that he establish the elements neces-
sary for the doctrine to apply. Succinctly 
stated, the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
applies where there is: 1) a promise, 2) 
which the promissor should reasonably ex-
pect to induce action or forebearance of a 
definite and substantial character, 3) which 
does, in fact, induce such action or fore-
bearance, and 4) injustice can only be avoid-
ed by enforcement of the promise. Tipton 
County Farm Bureau Co-op v. Hoover 
(1985), Ind.App., 475 N.E.2d 38. We need 
not consider the last three of these ele-
ments because Bogard's argument is fatal-
ly flawed on the first element—the exist-
ence of a promise. 
(3,41 Although it is recognized that no 
special form of words is necessary to cre-
agrce that 1983 is the proper year, and we will 
assume the trial court intended to refer to 1983 
and not 1982 in its findings. 
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ite a promise, the mere expression of an 
intention is not a promise. 17 Am.Jur.2d 
Contracts § 3 (1964) (citing E.I. Dupont 
Dt Nemours & Co. v. ClairborncReno 
Co. (8th Cir.1933), 64 F.2d 224, cert de-
nied, 290 U.S. 646, 54 S.Ct 64, 78 L.Ed. 
561). Thus, where A says, "I am going to 
tell my house. I want $70,000 for it," he 
has made a mere statement of intention 
tnd not a promise. L. Simpson, Contracts 
} 2 (1965) (citing Farina v. Fickus (1900), 1 
Ch. 331). Moreover, a prediction, opinion, 
or prophecy is not a promise. Calamari & 
Perillo, Contracts § 2-6 (1977). For exam-
ple, when a father asked a doctor how long 
hU son would be in the hospital and the 
doctor replied, "Three or four days, not 
over four," the doctor was not liable when 
the son remained in the hospital for over a 
month because the doctor had made a pre-
diction and not a promise. Id. (citing Haw-
.kins v, McGee (1929), 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 
$41. 
(5) Here, the trial court concluded Se-
curity promised to loan Bogard money 
when—according to Bogard's testimony-
Chestnut said, "Well, I'll take this to the 
loan committee and within two or three 
dayB, we ought to have something here, 
ready for you to go with." Record, pp. 
124-25. The first portion of this state-
ment, however—that he would take the 
application to the loan committee—was an 
expression of intention. Moreover, Chest-
nut's statement that they ought to have 
something in two or three days ready for 
him to go with was a prediction. As we 
previously stated, neither a prediction nor a 
statement of intention is a promise.1 
Thus, we conclude no contract existed 
between Security and Bogard because 
there was no mutuality of obligation, and 
Bogard was not entitled to recover under 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel be-
cause no promise was made by Security. 
3. Bogard also cites Tipton County Farm Bureau, 
supra, in support of his argument that the fact 
he had been involved with Security for thirty-
four years and with Chestnut for eleven or 
twelve years establishes that Security promised 
to lend him money. In Tipton County, however, 
an oral promise was made. The length of time 
lUST CO. v. U1HMIU) ind. y ^ y 
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Hence, the trial court's judgment for Bo-
gard on his counterclaim must be reversed. 
YOUNG, PJ., concurs in majority opin-
ion. 
CONOVER, J., dissents with opinion. 
CONOVER, Judge, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent. There was sub-
stantial evidence supporting the trial 
court's finding of promissory estoppel in 
my opinion. 
Bogard had been doing business with 
Security for 34 years. Throughout this 
relationship, Security apparently had 
cloaked its Oaktown branch managers with 
the authority to approve whatever loans 
the managers and Bogard agreed upon. 
The lending committee's so-called final ap-
proval was a mere "rubber stamp" formali-
ty under the apparent authority the bank 
bestowed upon the two branch managers 
with whom Bogard had dealt during that 
period. 
Over the years, Bogard had relied upon 
the branch managers' claims they had the 
authority to make the loans he had received 
from time to time. Bogard never had been 
turned down and was, according to Securi-
ty's assertions, a good customer. Based 
upon past practice, Bogard reasonably be-
lieved he would receive the loan he needed 
to prepare for his upcoming year's farming 
transactions because the branch manager 
had approved it. Nothing in the evidence 
can reasonably be said to put him on notice 
the approval procedure for this loan would 
be different from the bank's past practice. 
Farming provided Bogard with his liveli-
hood, Bogard's reliance was of a substan-
tial character. Given the long standing 
nature of the relationship and the detri-
ment which arose from the bank's refusal 
to make the loan, it is clear to me injustice 
that the parties had conducted business was 
probative of another element—whether the 
promissor should reasonably expect his promise 
to induce action or forebearance of a definite 
and substantial character—and not the determi-
nation of whether there was a promise or not. 
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can be avoided only by enforcing the agree-
ment. See, Citizens State Bank v. Peoples 
Dank (1985), Ind.App., 475 N.E.2d 324, 327; 
Larabee v. Booth (1984), Ind.App., 463 
N.E.2d 487, 490; sec also Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 90 (West 1981). 
A general judgment will be affirmed if it 
can be sustained on any legal theory by 
evidence introduced at trial. Erie-Haven v. 
Tippmann Refrigeration Construction 
(1985), Ind.App., 486 N.E.2d 646, 648. Ac-
cordingly, I would affirm the trial court's 
finding on the basis of promissory estoppel 
and remand for further proceedings to de-
termine appropriate damages. 
(O !llYNUMI|ISYS!IM> 
The BANK OF NEW YORK and 
Dreyfus Liquid Assets, Inc., 
Defendants-Appellants, 
v. 
Mildred BRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellee. 
No. 2-985A290. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana, 
Second District. 
June 30, 1986. 
Client brought action against invest-
ment company and bank as result of im-
proper liquidation of her account. The 
Hamilton Circuit Court, Judith S. Proffitt, 
J., entered judgment on jury verdict in fa-
vor of client for $30,000 and bank and 
investment company appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Ratliff, J., held that: (1) trial 
court did not abuse discretion in permitting 
client to pursue breach of contract theory, 
and (2) evidence supported award of com-
pensatory and punitive damages. 
Affirmed. 
Sullivan, J., concurred in result. 
I. Appeal and Error e=>236(l) 
Bank and investment company could 
not claim they were prejudiced in their 
defense against client's breach of contract 
theory, and trial court did not abuse discre-
tion in permitting client to pursue said the-
ory, which client informed bank and invest-
ment company that she would assert three 
days prior to trial, where bank and invest-
ment company failed to request continu-
ance when evidence supporting theory wa« 
adduced at trial. Trial Procedure Rule 
15(B). 
2. Pleading <3=307 
Trial court could properly permit client 
to litigate her breach of contract claim 
against investment company and bank, not-
withstanding her failure to comply with 
trial rule requiring party asserting claim 
based on written contract to attach doc-
ument to pleading; trial court was not re-
quired to order compliance with trial rule. 
Trial Procedure Rule 9.2(A). 
3. Compromise and Settlement $=>5(2) 
Actions of bank and investment compa-
ny in fully recrediting client's account prior 
to trial on claim resulting from improper 
liquidation of account constituted only uni-
lateral offer to settle controversy and did 
not preclude client from recovering com-
pensatory damages, where client never ac-
cepted the offer to settle. 
4. Banks and Banking «=>100, 315(1) 
Client asserting claim against invest-
ment company and bank aa result of im-
proper liquidation of her account was re-
quired to establish, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that conduct exhibited elemenU 
of fraud, malice, gross negligence, or op-
pression, to recover punitive damages, re-
gardless of whether she ultimately suc-
ceeded on theory of either breach of con-
tract or tortious conversion. 
5. Banks and Banking «=»100, 315(1) 
Evidence of conduct of bank and in-
vestment company once it had been in-
cite as 494 N.K_2d 970 
formed of its error in liquidating client's 
account was sufficient to support finding 
that bank and investment company had en-
gaged in tortious conduct of type warrant-
ing punitive damages, where bank and in-
vestment company failed to adequately re-
spond to several inquiries of client's hus-
band and attorney concerning disputed 
transaction. 
6. Appeal and Error <3=»756 
Applicability of provision in client's ac-
count application absolving bank and in-
vestment company of liability for acting on 
instructions believed to be genuine to 
client's action arising out of their improj>er 
liquidation of her account would not be 
addressed, absent citation to authority in 
support of argument. Rules App.Proc., 
Rule 8.3(AX7). 
7. Appeal and Error <*=*1078<4). 1079 
Contention that trial court erred when 
it gave client's instructions on tortious con-
version and accord and satisfaction, in ac-
tion against investment company and bank 
arising from improper liquidation of client's 
account, was waived by failure of bank and 
investment company to set out in their 
briefs verbatim objections to instructions 
and to make more than barest argument in 
support of position. Rules App.Proc., Rule 
8.3(A)(7); Trial Procedure Rule 51(C). 
8. Damages <3=»214 
Instruction on mitigation of damages 
was not required in action by client against 
bank and investment company for improper 
liquidation of account absent evidence indi-
cating that client could have reasonably 
taken additional steps to mitigate damages. 
M. Kent Newton, Kelly R. Noma, Tab-
be rt & Capehart, Indianapolis, for defend-
ants-appellanU. 
C. Wendell Martin, Robert L. Hartley, 
Jr., Martin, Wade, Hartley, Hollingsworth, 
Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee. 
(Ind.App 2 DUI. I9M) 
RATLIFF, Judge, writing by designa-
tion. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants, The Bank of New York and 
Dreyfus Liquid Assets, Inc., appeal from a 
judgment entered by the Hamilton Circuit 
Court on a jury verdict in favor of Mildred 
Bright for $30,000. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Mildred Bright opened an investment ac-
count with Dreyfus Liquid Assets in De-
cember, 1981. The Bank of New York, as 
transfer agent for Dreyfus Liquid Assets, 
had custody of and administered this ac-
count. By October, 1982, Mildred's ac-
count had a balance of $6,165.84. 
Sometime near the end of September, 
1982, the bank received instructions from a 
Mildred Bright of Solana Beach, California, 
to liquidate the account she held in the 
Dreyfus Mutual Fund. The signature on 
this order was guaranteed by the broker-
age firm of Dean Witter Reynolds. The 
bank, however, liquidated the Dreyfus Liq-
uid Assets account belonging to Mildred 
Bright of Indianapolis, Indiana. On Octo-
ber 4, 1982, the bank issued a check to 
Mildred Bright of Indianapolis, Indiana, for 
$6,185.84, but mailed it to Mildred Bright 
of Solana Beach, California, who promptly 
cashed it. 
On February 7, 1983, Mildred Bright of 
Indianapolis, Indiana, received her quarter-
ly dividend advice statement from Dreyfus 
Liquid Assets showing that her account 
had a zero balance. The following day 
Mildred's husband, Joe, called the toll free 
number printed on the advice to inquire 
about the status of her account He was 
told that the bank had a research depart-
ment to handle these problems and to call 
again in 24 to 48 hours. When Joe called 
on February 10, 1983, he was told the mat-
ter was being researched. At that time, he 
requested a copy of the liquidation transac-
tion and was told one would be sent Five 
days later Joe made his third call to the 
bank's toll free number and was informed 
that the matter was still being researched. 
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A 
Q 
Yes, at that point, yes. 
Now, at some point you went into the State 
Bank? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recall when that was? 
A I would guess it would be mid to late 
January with basically the same package that we had at 
Zions. 
Q I would like to have, if you would, 
basically, meeting by meeting and discussion by 
discussion, take me through your dealings with State 
Bank. I realize you are not going to be able to give 
me every date, but to the extent that we can, I would 
like to keep the significant discussions and meetings 
separate so that we can sort of piece this together. 
Tell me what your first meeting was with State Bank or 
any of its representatives? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
anyone? 
A 
My first meeting was with Lee. 
Do you recall when that was? 
Here again, mid to late January. 
That was in his office? 
In his office at State Bank, right. 
Do you recall who else was present, if 
I think he may have -- I don't know if 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 33 
(801) 363-7939 
anyone was present for our talks, but I think he 
introduced me -- here again, we had been there with 
our checking account, but I don't think I had even met 
Lee before that. He may have introduced me to Elwyn 
and some of the other guys, but basically that's it. 
Q Did you bring any papers with you to that 
first meeting? 
A I don't remember. I don't recall if I had 
the SBA papers with me or if I had just come in to 
initially meet Lee and talk to him conceptually about 
this . 
Q Do you remember what was said and by whom 
in that first meeting? 
A I basically laid out the plan as we had 
proposed it to Zions Bank. Lee reacted to that plan 
or to that explanation of and conception of what we 
were doing in at least a little bit above a neutral 
fashion. Sounds good, bring the papers in. He 
probably didn't even say it sounded good, but we will 
take a look at it. 
Q Do you recall him saying anything else in 
response to your inquiry? 
A No. 
Q Tell me a little bit about the plan that 
you submitted to him. Did it include continuing to 
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lease the four greenhouses from the Christensens that 
were already in place or did it contemplate at that 
time that you would purchase the four greenhouses that 
were already in place? 
A Initially, we had planned to continue 
leasing those greenhouses from Boyd and building, and 
I think we, even at that time, had gone from six to 
five. I don't recall specifically, but let's say that 
we went from six to five on one of the 20 acre parcels 
or on the 40 across the road. That was the initial 
plan and that we were trying to see if we could get 
enough money by using the two 20 acre parcels as 
collateral to basically buy the greenhouses and put 
those units up. 
Q On the 20 acres? 
A Right, or 40 or whatever. 
Q Did Mr. Fife ask you to come back or did he 
ask you to get information and then come back or what 
did he tell you to do after that? 
A I don't know that he told me to do 
anything. We agreed that I would come back probably 
later that week or the next week with the information, 
some more specific information about what we proposed 
to do. 
Q What did you do after that first meeting? 
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A I would probably have been on the phone to 
Mike that evening and basically reported to him about 
the meeting with Lee and made sure that I had all of 
the information, the pro formas that had been provided 
for Zions and whatever information, if indeed he had 
asked me for more information. I don't know that he 
would have at that point because he hadn't seen 
anything, but basically get all of the data together 
that we had accumulated and go see Lee again. 
Q Did you do that? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recall what data you put together? 
A We had some of the SBA forms that had been 
filled out. I don't recall which ones had been filled 
out, but probably the simpler ones that would require 
like appraisals and things like that. 
Certainly pro formas on what we projected could 
be done based on what we already had done in New 
Castle. Probably geothermal data, heat, what it cost 
us to heat these things so you could show where the 
potential for covering the debt would be and then, of 
course, the cost of the greenhouses. Since we were 
manufacturing the greenhouses themselves, that would 
have been part of it. 
Q You would have already had that information 
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internally? 
A We would have already had that. All of the 
ratios and things like that, Mike and Lee did over the 
phone, I'm sure. I'm sure I am not that financially 
oriented to be able to do that kind of thing, but 
basically the simpler things that I could provide 
would have been probably in a package at that second 
meeting. 
Q When did that second meeting take place? 
A I would guess some time either late January 
or first part of February of '85. 
Q Do you recall who was present at that 
meeting? 
A That would have just been Lee and I. 
Q Tell me what was said and by whom at that 
meeting? 
A Lee, at that point, would probably have 
said he would take a look at it, 
Q Do you recall anything else specific being 
discussed? 
A No. 
Q When you say probably would have said that, 
that tells me that you don't remember exactly, but you 
are assuming from all of the other facts that you know 
that that's what took place? 
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A Right. Lee didn't write me a check at that 
point. Let's put it that way. 
MR. HIGBEE: Off the record for just one 
second. 
(Brief recess) 
Q (By Mr. Higbee) Mr. Markell, I believe when 
we went off the record, we were basically up to the 
second meeting with Mr. Fife, chronologically, and we 
were just kind of going through your meetings and 
dealings with the bank from start to finish. Do you 
recall anything else of that second meeting of any 
significance? 
A No. 
Q What happened next? 
A The next thing I recall and I know that 
there had to be subsequent meetings between Lee and 
myself, but the next thing that I can remember --
because we meet a lot. I don't know, but a couple two 
or three times a week sometimes. If I happened to be 
in there, I would stop and we would talk about where 
we were as far as what information we needed to be 
gathering, as far as putting an SBA thing together and 
here again, still on the first initial $170,000 thing. 
The next one that I recall was when Boyd 
Christensen shocked me basically by being a little bit 
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insistent that we consider purchasing. That was in 
March. Now, we go from January or the latter part of 
January, first part of February, to the latter part of 
March. 
Q So two months span? 
A Yeah. Here again, the individual meetings 
with Lee between the end of January or the first part 
of March and that one meeting when I came back to him 
with the information I got from Boyd, I don't know 
what transpired there. 
Q Would it be safe to say that just what I 
will call the routine fact gathering and discussions? 
A Right. I would characterize it that way, 
right. 
Q Anything of significance you recall being 
said? 
MR. CALL: During what time? 
Q (By Mr. Higbee) During this two month time 
period, between the end of January and the end of 
March? 
A Nothing significant other than we had not 
been discouraged from continuing this process of 
gathering information to try to put this loan 
together. 
Q But at that point, no commitments had been 
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made? 
A No. 
Q Now, you have referenced this conversation 
with Boyd Christensen. Where did that conversation 
take place? 
A This one took place in his corral out at 
his farm in New Castle towards the end of March of 
'85. It might have even been the first part of 
April. 
Q Who was present? 
A Boyd and myself. 
Q Tell me what Mr. Christensen said and what 
you said in return? 
A Specifically, I was down there because we 
had been having some problems to having to heat the 
greenhouses. That was this pump situation, I think. 
There was some problem of getting him to pay part of 
our costs for leasing the operation. Apparently there 
was some things that had gone wrong that he assumed 
liability for and we were trying to get him to pay for 
it. 
Q This is the well pump that you are talking 
about? 
A Yeah. I think this is the well pump point. 
He was pretty adamant about -- at this point, I think 
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the money between you and Michael in that second 
conversation? 
A Probably nothing other than the fact that 
he had always said that he needed money. He needed 
money. Boyd always needed money. He would comment 
that if he had a million dollars, he would just blow 
it farming. 
Q Just keep farming until it was gone? 
A Yeah, that's right. 
Q So in that sense, it wasn't a real surprise 
that Boyd needed the money then? 
A No. Here again, unless you got into his 
personal stuff, and you wouldn't want to do that. 
Q What happened next? By now I take it we 
are somewhere around the first part of April, within 
the first few days of April? 
A Right. 
Q Tell me what happened next in relation to 
this entire transaction? 
A The next thing that's in my mind was going 
to see Lee, here again, still talking about'maybe 
collateralizing this and building the greenhouse on 
the 20 and telling him -- I remember meeting in April. 
It wasn't April Fool's Day. It was income tax. It 
was the 15th of April, 1985 because it was IRS day and 
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I was going to be late. I told Lee that Boyd had 
mentioned buying the place and I remember specifically 
laying that out, not trying to draw Lee in or 
anything, because it was something totally out of this 
world to me how — well, there was just no way we 
could do that. When I told him Boyd wanted 150,000 
for that, and that was totally out of the picture, I 
was shocked that Lee even flicked the bait out at all. 
Q What was his response? 
A His response was, well, let's not jump to 
conclusions. Let's take a look at it. That was 
exactly what he said. We will take a look at it, 
because I was just floored. 
Q That was sort of Lee's pat answer is we 
will take a look at it? 
A Yeah, exactly. But obviously, to me it was 
a no sale. To me it was an absolute impossibility and 
for Lee to even say, well, let's take a look at it was 
cause for doing back flips because Lee was our guy. 
Q You said several times that for you, you 
thought it would be impossible or difficult and I 
can't remember the exact words you used. But was that 
because you were concerned that you would not be able 
to put up enough collateral to take care of the bank's 
desires to be secured? 
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A I would have to say that I felt it was way 
out in left field and probably because of my lack of 
financial wherewithal. I didn't know the options. I 
didn't know -- to me it was just like why anybody 
would want to spend $30,000 on a car. It has a lot to 
do with my background and the way I was brought up and 
things and it was totally off base. 
Q Did you have any concerns about the 
company's ability to meet the debt service if you had 
to borrow the $150,000 or do you recall that occurring 
to you? 
A Well, all the pro formas were based on nine 
greenhouses at that point. The pro formas indicated 
that there would be absolutely no problem, even if we 
did half of what we had projected. I forget what the 
break was, but it was something like ten pounds a 
plant or twelve pounds a plant or whatever. So I felt 
pretty good about that, but it was just a matter that 
there's no way anybody would loan — let's face it, 
Zions Bank turned us down. 
Q Mike and I talked a little about that in 
his deposition. Fifteen hundred dollars is a healthy 
amount and there's not an awful lot of difference 
between that and the debt service amount? 
A Right. 
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Q Anything else you remember being discussed 
in that conversation? 
A We would have periodic conversations like 
that. From that point, his attitude changed and when 
he found out that we were actively trying, putting 
forth an effort to basically getting what he wanted, 
to buy his land, his attitude changed considerably and 
I think he did everything he could to help us and 
himself at the same time to see that happen. 
Q What did you do next to move this project 
forward? 
A I would guess that at this point -- no, I 
don't guess, but I would say specifically that 
probably in May, it had gotten to the point where it 
had gotten serious that Mike and Lee had talked ratios 
and all of these specific terminologies that I'm not 
real connected with, but that it was serious and it 
was time to get appraisals and put into practicality 
what at that point was theory, that maybe these things 
would be worth X amount of dollars. 
What's the geothermal resource worth based on 
all of these appraisals, so at that point, it would 
have been in earnest. I think it was May or June even 
when the appraisal was done, the first one. 
Q Did you have meetings with Mr. Fife during 
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this time? 
A I met with Lee Fife, at that point at 
least, conservatively twice a week. 
Q Is there any one particular meeting during 
that period of time, and I'm going from late April of 
'85 through, I believe, you threw out the term June of 
'85, so basically the last part of April, May and 
June, any one meeting that stands out in your mind of 
any discussions with Mr. Fife? 
A No, not at all. It was always up beat and 
positive. Take it step by step. Lee would basically 
tell me what information he needed, where we are at. 
We have got to get the appraisals, so I would make 
arrangements for that to happen. At whatever stage we 
were, it was up to me to do the leg work, whether it 
be getting updated financial statements from East Troy 
and basically push their button back there to get them 
to supply information or get it ourselves so that we 
could get this package put together. 
Q During this period of time, did you guys 
have a time table that you were shooting for to get 
things in place and completed? 
A We had a loose time table that had been 
pro formaed out, I think, optimistically on one end, I 
think, it was the end of July of '85 that that would 
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have been the best of all possible worlds to start 
construction through, I think, the end of September or 
maybe even the middle of September. It's on the pro 
formas, whatever the pro formas were. Obviously 
that's what everything was based on was the pro formas 
too, so the timing was there. 
Q Do you recall discussing the timing with 
Mr. Fife in any of these conversations from the first 
meeting in January up through the end of June that we 
are to now, chronologically? 
A At that point, we hadn't even approached 
our optimum time table. There wasn't any discussion 
about the timing at this point. Believe me, we were 
real busy doing the other things. 
Q And production and stuff? 
A Oh, yes, exactly. 
Q What are the kinds of things -- I realize 
that you can't remember every discussion that you had 
in that two month period, but what are the kinds of 
things that you discussed? Focus in as narrowly as 
you can and without pinning it down to a certain day, 
tell me what you and Lee talked about during those two 
months? 
A I would say probably 75 percent of our 
conversation had to do with problems that we were 
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having getting information. The Christensens -- we 
would have an appraisal done and pay for it and 
everything would be hunky-dory and have the legal 
description done and they would say, oh, there's a 
pipeline on the back of this property. So we would 
have to redo. That's one example. The electric 
company had to have a right of way right down the 
middle. So we had to hassle with that. And of 
course, all the T's had to be crossed and I's dotted 
for the SBA, so there were many instances like that. 
Set backs and the easements and it was just a big 
hassle. 
Q Just sort of nobody's fault type of things? 
A That would be 75 percent of the 
conversations. It always started, how's it going, 
pretty good. How's everything with you and then the 
last part of it would be well, what do you think, how 
do you think things look and Lee would always, I 
think, probably be very careful not to mislead us that 
this is a done deal because at that point, it wasn't. 
Q This is through June? 
A Right. 
Q What kind of things would he say to let you 
know it was not a done deal? 
A Well, the board hasn't approved it yet or 
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I have tried to do. Is there anything else that 
happened in this period of time that you think is of 
significance that is in addition to the things that 
you have told us about already? 
A Through what? 
MR. CALL: Are you asking May and June? 
Q (By Mr. Higbee) I'm asking you through June 
of 1985. 
A No, I think that about covers it. We just 
had our noses to the grindstone at that point in time. 
Q I don't know why we ended up with June. 
That's just where things stopped and now we will pick 
up and go. But tell me after June what happened as 
this matter progressed? 
A From probably the mid part of June right on 
through to the closing, the pressures began as far as 
our time table of construction scenario with 
relationship to how much of this work had been done 
and the delays that had not only preceded us, but that 
I foresaw coming up. At that point, I wouldn't say 
that I started to get worried about it, but at that 
point, I would mention it periodically to Lee. 
Q This was towards the end of June of 19 --
A First part of July. 
Q You mentioned the pressures that brought 
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time? 
A I would say things like well, I hope we can 
get this put together pretty soon because I have got 
to get started or at least start to make plans. At 
this point, we didn't even have a verbal, that I 
recall, but I knew that the bank itself I don't think 
had to have SBA formal approval to at least run it by 
their board of directors. I think they were one of 
those banks that could do it independently, I think. 
Q Did you discuss that with Mr. Fife? 
A I mentioned it a couple of times, yes• 
Q What was his response? 
A We would have to go through the regular 
channels. I really don't, at this point, recall what 
they would be. Whether it would be the board at the 
bank would approve it first or whether it goes to Salt 
Lake or whatever. But he was up there a lot. He had 
been talking with the guys up there about what some of 
the possibilities were down here and it led me to 
believe that at that point things looked pretty good. 
Q Some more of this cautious optimism stuff? 
A At that point in time, it was probably more 
than cautious. 
Q Tell me what Mr. Fife said to make you 
believe it was more than cautious? 
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A Things like it looks pretty good was one of 
the more common ones. He stopped the we will run it 
by them syndrome. That was not there any more. He 
had got down to specifics, if this and this and this. 
For instance, if the ratios, the loan ratios are this 
and we have that it is collateralized to this degree, 
then that will fly with the financial folks at the SBA 
or the bank, things like that. It was less negative. 
Let's put it that way. At least it was more positive. 
It wasn't -- here again, we didn't have a check yet, 
so I can't say that Lee was overly optimistic, but it 
was definitely get your heart racing. 
Q Over what period of time were these 
comments that you just described to me? 
A This would be from the first part of July 
until we did get a verbal, which I think was August or 
something. 
Q Verbal commitment from the SBA? 
A Right. 
Q So Lee would make these types of comments 
up until the verbal approval? 
A Right. 
Q When the verbal approval came in, whatever 
time that was, do you recall discussing that with Mr. 
Fife? 
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A Sure. As far as I was led to believe, a 
verbal was the next step to getting the money. That 
was my understanding. We knew we had to go through 
the steps of the formal application, but that was a 
breeze because basically all of the work we had 
already done was satisfactory and up to snuff and all 
we had to do was put it down on paper and slide it 
through and we are in. It was going to be a breeze. 
It had better have been a breeze at that point, 
because we were definitely now into the period where 
it was going to be nip and tuck if we could get it 
finished and in production on schedule. 
Q When Mr. Fife told you that the SBA had 
given verbal approval, was that in a face to face 
meeting or on the telephone? 
A Face to face meeting in his office. 
Q At or shortly about the date that that 
approval was given? 
MR. CALL: What approval are you talking 
about? 
Q (By Mr. Higbee) The SBA verbal approval? 
A It was that day. I think he had told me 
that he had talked to them in the morning. He had 
been up there and presented I don't know what 
documents, but had talked to -- what was his name, 
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Stan DeConno or something. 
Q What did he say to you at that time? 
A He was happy that they had approved -- it 
was verbally approved and they had approved it. We 
got the verbal approval, was basically what he said. 
Q Did he tell you what that meant? What were 
the words he used? 
A We got the verbal approval and it looks 
great. It looks good. We will do the formal 
application now. I would probably have asked him 
well, of what significance is verbal approval and 
that's that everything looks good on paper. 
Everything we have done so far and everything has been 
done and now we just have to go through the process of 
submitting it. It was a big day to us because all of 
that work had been done and we were at this point 
feeling pretty good about things. 
Q During this period of time from the end of 
June which is sort of where we left off in the last 
time frame to the time the verbal approval was given 
by the SBA, were there any discussions between you and 
Mr. Fife about the time frames, about your scheduling 
needs and your concerns of the upcoming pressures, as 
you have characterized it? 
A It had increased from the first of July 
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until whenever this verbal approval was and I wish I 
had the date. The first of September or in August. 
It had consistently escalated. I would relate to Lee 
that well, I sure hope things go the way we had 
planned because it was going to be tight. Then — 
here again, I don't want to jump ahead, but it had 
gradually escalated to the point that he knew I was 
very concerned about it. I don't know if Mike 
mentioned it, but I had mentioned to Mike that I was 
worried about it. 
Q What did Lee respond when you told him 
those things? 
A He's doing the best he can. 
Q What other words do you recall Mr. Fife 
using between you and he as you discussed this problem 
of the time pressures? 
A I don't want to say that he dismissed it 
because I know he was concerned. He was on our side. 
He was concerned about things, but it was always like 
it doesn't exist, like we would deal with it. As far 
as specifically what he said, probably saying nothing 
said it all. 
Q Did he give you any commitment during that 
period of time as to when it would be available or 
when it would be completed or when it would be funded? 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 70 
(801) 363-7939 
A Soon. That would be Lee's commitment. 
Q Do you recall him using that word? 
A Yes , soon. 
Q Anything else on that topic that you recall 
being discussed between you and Mr. Fife during that 
time period? 
A No. That would be it through when we got 
the verbal. 
Q Tell me what you did after you got the 
verbal from that meeting in Mr. Fife's office? 
A Spent a week of not seeing Lee and waiting 
for the official notification. 
Q Who was finishing up the paperwork at that 
time? 
A That would have been between Lee and I, but 
I think he had most of it. Mike and he would talk 
periodically on the phone about getting this form or 
that form from East Troy. At this point, the 
corporate thing came into it. We had pretty much 
finished with my day to day or week to week, or 
whatever. So about a week following that verbal, 
things were pretty good. 
Q Were you involved in the numbers; that is, 
how much they were going to borrow, how it was going 
to be paid back, what the interest rates were and 
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A Right, 
Q What happened next? What's the next event 
of significance that you remember? 
A The next time I saw Lee, I went in and 
asked him how long it was going to be before we got 
the money. That was the big question. 
Q What was his answer? 
A Number one, how was he coming and had he 
gotten the paperwork submitted, the application 
formalized and submitted, which, I think he had, at 
that point. It was a relatively fast procedure. 
Q When did that conversation take place? 
A That would have been about a week after 
that, so here again, based on that verbal, September 
1st. 
Q Roughly? 
A Yes. 
Q What was Mr. Fife's response to your 
inquiries? 
A Soon. It would be soon. The process — as 
soon as the SBA got the package and I think he may 
have even been going to take it up there which was a 
common thing. He was going to Salt Lake a lot. So 
here again, I can't say he told me to relax and don't 
worry about it, but he said soon. So this would be 
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another week shot in my mind. At this point, I was 
starting to get the idea that a week here and a week 
there and that's the type of thing I would tell him, a 
day here or a week here or as days stretch into weeks, 
those are the kind of things I'm worried about as far 
as getting started here because depending on the 
weather, I have seen Decembers in New Castle as 
witnessed there this year, that it can be pretty bad, 
to the point where you couldn't do anything. That was 
what I was just petrified of. 
Q Did you express to him those concerns? 
A Yes. 
Q What was his response? 
A What could he say? He didn't really 
respond to it. He listened to me intently and well, 
we will do the best we can type of thing. He never 
said anything like, oh, don't worry about it or 
anything like that, but he basically --
Q Really, that's all he could have said? 
A Yeah. I was probably whining at the wrong 
guy at that point. 
Q Then what was the next thing of 
significance that happened, as best you recall? 
A After, I think, probably -- or I know very 
soon afterwards and I would guess this to be around 
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the 15th of September or maybe even the 1st. 
Somewhere between the 1st and the 15th we got the 
written approval from the SBA. We are in. As far as 
I was concerned, that was as good as a check. I mean 
they said, okay, so let's go. I went in to see Lee, 
here again, to press him and to find out when we were 
going to do this, when we were going to be able to get 
going. 
Q When you say you went in to see Lee, did 
you know the SBA had given written approval? 
A Yes. He had called me and had gotten it in 
the mail. He was up there and got it or up there and 
knew that they sent it. So there was a three day 
period in there, again, another three days where we 
knew it was coming, but he had to get it type of 
thing. So he did get it. 
Q So then you went into his office? 
A Yes. 
Q Who was present in that conversation? 
A Just Lee and I. 
Q What was said and by whom? 
A I was asking him what the process was in 
getting the money to get started, how to proceed here 
to make plans in getting some people on the site and 
he answered to the question when I asked him when we 
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were going to get the money, it was, he didn't know at 
which point I really started to press him, probably a 
little bit too vigorously these delays would cause — 
Q What did you say? 
A I would just go back over the point that if 
we get delayed here too much longer, it's going to be 
a matter of getting into the winter time and that's 
going to cost us more money to build. It's going to 
delay us into the spring. I made him aware and he was 
aware. Here again, I was covering the same ground 
every time, of what this was going to do. At that 
point, he basically just reached over and grabbed the 
whole SBA package, sat it in front of me and said, "Go 
see if you can peddle it to another bank." 
Q Did he explain to you what that meant? 
A No. Here again, to me it was a check that 
was made out that nobody had endorsed. That's the way 
I looked at it. I didn't know why. I had no idea why 
he did that. No clue at that point. I was glad. 
Gosh, here I might be able to do it and get the money 
soon to get started. I thought maybe if some other 
bank took it, took the loan for State Bank, that they 
would still have it in some way. I had no idea why 
this was happening other than the fact when I did go 
to the other bank, they all looked at me pretty 
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anybody else that we shouldn't believe that certain 
events were going to happen in a certain timely 
fashion and they hadn't. So for lack of a better 
term, be gun shy at that point. 
Q You said you were led to believe that 
certain things would happen. I would like to know 
specifically what things you were led to believe would 
happen and what led you to believe they would happen. 
Take them one at a time. 
A The simple fact that no one led us to 
believe that they wouldn't happen. 
Q Let's put the horse ahead of the cart. 
What things were going to happen? 
A That right from the beginning that the SBA 
approval would be coming, that the funds would be made 
available soon. That's it. That's the quote. That 
it looked great with regard to the approval of the 
package. I mean that's certainly --
Q So those are the two things. The SBA 
approval and the funding of the loan were the two 
things that you were led to believe that would happen? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q Anything else that you were led to believe 
that would happen? 
A No. 
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Q The things that led you to believe that 
were, and I'm saying this as broadly as I can, from 
what you said in your favor, that the bank knew about 
your scheduling requirements because of the pro formas 
that you had given to them and also because of the 
statements that you began to make to Mr. Fife starting 
in the first of July? 
A Yes. 
Q Mr. Fife had said soon, it looked good, 
coupled with the periodic reports on the specifics; 
that is, the appraisal is in, this is in and that's in 
and those sorts of things. Anything else that you can 
think of that led you to believe, in your words, that 
the SBA approval would be given and the funding of the 
loan would be completed? 
A No. 
Q Other than the pro forma statement showing 
the dates and your statements to Mr. Fife about the 
dates, there was never a commitment from the bank as 
to when the funding would be available? 
A Well, the way we looked at it and maybe 
it's relevant and maybe it isn't --
Q The way you looked at it is relevant. 
A That if you propose to do that pro forma, 
in a narrative situation, is that if you apply for a 
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(Examination by Mr. Higbee) 
as soon as we get that, that the bank can process the 
stuff, that we can get at least a preliminary 
construction loan and we can start construction. And 
now we were at a point where, given our construction, 
you know, schedule, you know, we're starting to push 
it. 
Q. Okay. You said you were given the 
impression that that could take place, that the 
construction funds could be advanced immediately. Did 
the bank ever say or do anything directly with you, 
not through Markell, but directly with you, to give 
you the impression that the funds could be advanced 
right away? 
A. I don't recall a specific conversation where 
Lee told me personally, or anybody at the bank said 
personally that — I was the paperwork signer, I was 
the conceptual developer, and I was party to the 
conceptual approvals or agreements, and inherent in 
those agreements and in those discussions was this 
construction scenario, which to our mind was nothing 
-- this is rather standard, I mean, just common sense 
will tell you that that schedule has to be reasonably 
adhered to. Again, there was leeway built into it, 
and it could slip some, but we just -- all along after 
we got the verbal, that's what we were both, Jim and 
DFANMA H. ATKTNSON — CAPITOL REPORTERS 
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I, were concerned about, is if we're going i be 
building August at the latest and 
that's what juess it's not so much hit the bank 
or Lee speci! said to me; it's what he didn't 
i j 
we wo 
Q. 
A . 
gave me the impression that, t i I i itest, 
the end of August, 
he didn't say it; you assumed it? 
based on the fact that if I 
was mistake] ie would have ample o p p o r t m I to 
correct my ' > .--• ytion. 
Q . koy. We come "~ to fhe t i me 
closi ng, UP. , 'ctober. At that poir::: , you U-.-t-w 
exactly where v ^ ^ere. Did you tell , :'s 
too late, we j.i\y more"? 
^. No • 
A. ••• ' ahead and did it anyway. n 
hindsight, ... t decision that I ever 
ie. By that point we had too much money , We 
=*d ~ -rw r>" : aere com. x \.o doing the 
.istruction that was hired specifically l U n ' 
fasi 
Q. Who's that? 
A. Mike LafJ in. e concept, tiu *hc 
ipment scenario, you know, all ^. \ .. -
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could only slip so much. 
Q. Did the bank ever say, in effect or anything 
similar to this, "Okay, we agree that we will fund the 
loan in time to meet with your schedule"? 
A. I don't remember an exact conversation. 
Maybe they had one with Jim, or maybe said something 
to that effect to him, but not directly to me. 
Q. By what date was the bank committed to loan 
the money? You're saying by the 31st of August? 
A. That was the date that everybody — or end 
of August, something to that effect, was the date that 
everybody was agreeing to, either by stating it, at 
least in our case, on a regular basis, or by the fact 
that they never — the bank never said anything 
otherwise. In other words, even if they didn't say it 
would be this particular date, they were well aware of 
the schedule; they had ample opportunity to say, 
"That's just not realistic. We don't think we can do 
it by then" or, "No, you guys are unrealistic. This 
thing isn't going to get done until October." They 
had every opportunity to, if our assumption and what 
we were telling them was naive or a bad assumption, 
they had every opportunity to set us straight, and 
they never did. 
Q. So you're saying, then, if I understand what 
DEANNA H. ATKINSON -- CAPITOL REPORTERS 
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A. Uh-huh. 
Q. -- ' tted uu loan Troy the amount ul 
$325,000 upon approval by the SBA " When was that 
: : iiiiii:ii I:iiit• = i :t t 1 1 i a t ^ • : i i allege made? 
MR. CALL: Now, youfrn asking him that 
ygro? Because we're going to 
have problems here, because some of the information 
cers of Troy. 
Based the best knowledge that you have 
resent time, as you sit here, 
he commitment that you referred in Paragraph 
The commitment was made, t- my knowledge, as 
Lierent art o lucin :: r r: 1 icat ion 
package and the narrative that went along with it, 
here we * anu then iil 
egular discussions with them, that 
:.u L clied i. 1 , i " I I l„ , " i '" ,„ 
k n o v , t h - " 
3ne w d b n • u 
wast :^. concrete and that it could slip; but in any 
/-^ c^r^  that we cei 4 i 1 , • „ "1 i, I 1 "I I i I V < I Il I I I ]| > I. I I! Ill II II 1 '( Ill II 
construction „ d the end of August. And 
uplied or -- everybody 
at least Lee, that there was this schedule 
TT
° were -- and especiali 
m d especially as things dragged 
either 
a n ; t 
he s. aedule 
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(Examination by Mr. Higbee) 
could only slip so much. 
Q. Did the bank ever say, in effect or anything 
similar to this, "Okay, we agree that we will fund the 
loan in time to meet with your schedule11? 
A. I don't remember an exact conversation. 
Maybe they had one with Jim, or maybe said something 
to that effect to him, but not directly to me. 
Q. By what date was the bank committed to loan 
the money? You're saying by the 31st of August? 
A. That was the date that everybody — or end 
of August, something to that effect, was the date that 
everybody was agreeing to, either by stating it, at 
least in our case, on a regular basis, or by the fact 
that they never — the bank never said anything 
otherwise. In other words, even if they didn't say it 
would be this particular date, they were well aware of 
the schedule; they had ample opportunity to say, 
"That's just not realistic. We don't think we can do 
it by then" or, "No, you guys are unrealistic. This 
thing isn't going to get done until October." They 
had every opportunity to, if our assumption and what 
we were telling them was naive or a bad assumption, 
they had every opportunity to set us straight, and 
they never did. 
Q. So you're saying, then, if I understand what 
DEANNA H. ATKINSON -- CAPITOL REPORTERS 
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(Examination by Mr. Higbee) 
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1. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
1" 
vou said correctly, that you're not aware of the bank 
ever saying that they would meet your schedule, but 
\.:.ey did not say that they wouldn't, based on all the 
facts that were available to them? 
A. Yes, as far as with me personally. 
Q. Okay No \ /, it's importan t the date that 
L;:e bank committed to loan the money, and you say 
that's the end of August sometime? 
A. Well t depends n what -- I aon-i really 
know w 1 i a t would be, from a legal standpoint, def in e d 
as whei I tl n . Th» 
know, first you get an approval from Lee. He 
say L • : r i = ; e I! • = i : y I - e in s t • : 
:•• order; and I in the meantime, r.c ' .-. 
i 
point where he runs it the board. 
really remember when that was. It was before -
i: e a ] ] ;; I: I a ,„ :i t • : • 11 : = 1: • e f c • i : • = 11: l e applicai • : 
the SBA I believe the board approved it. : c>. ,irse, 
s u b j e c !:  t: • : • 1 1 i e 1 o a 
Q. Which was given sometime around the end of 
August- as T remember? 
A. Yes, I believe well, yeah, the 
application - - finally, Lee said, f i i I a 1 1 y , MWe go 11 a 
DEANNA H. ATKINSON CAPITOL REPORTERS 
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HKGLAR RANCH, INC., an Idaho Corpo-
ration, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Uona rd M. STILLMAN and Juanita P. 
Stillman, husband and wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 16830. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 12. 1980. 
Purchasers appealed summary judg-
ment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J., on promis-
sory note, contending that factual issue was 
raised by their defense of duress which 
made summary judgment inappropriate. 
The Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that pur-
chasers failed to prove duress. 
Affirmed. 
1. Judgment <£=» 181(2. 3) 
Summary judgment is appropriate if 
pleadings and all other submissions, includ-
ing depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
admissions, and affidavits show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as matter of law. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 56(c). 
2. Judgment <*=» 181(2) 
Rule that summary judgment is appro-
priate if pleadings and all other submissions 
show that there is no genuine issue as to 
material fact and that moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as matter of law does not 
preclude summary judgment simply when-
ever some fact remains in dispute, but only 
when a material fact is genuinely contro-
verted. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
56(c). 
3. Contracts c=>95(l) 
To invalidate a contract, a party there-
to must show that other contracting party 
committed harmful act which put initial 
party in fear such as to compel him to act 
against his will. 
4. Bills and Notes c^Ji'JO 
Purchasers failed to prove duress as 
(iefense to action involving promissory note, 
execution of which was condition imposed 
uj>on purchasers l>efore entering into a 
second real estate agreement after they had 
failed to perform first agreement, where 
purchasers failed in any way to demon-
strate how it was wrongful for vendor to 
follow advice of counsel and impose condi-
tions upon reinstatement of real estate 
agreement so as to insure against further 
financial loss in event of second failure to 
j>erform contract, and purchasers were not 
placed in such fear as would have deprived 
them of their frt'e will since, by one pur-
chaser's own admission, had purchasers cho-
sen to walk away from negotiations, only 
consequence thereof would have been loss 
of whatever benefits deal might have af-
forded them had it l>een closed. 
Robert R Brown, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and appellants. 
George N Larsen, James F. Shepherd, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff-respondent 
HALL, Justice: 
Defendants appeal the summary judg-
ment of the district court on a promissory 
note, contending that a factual issue was 
raised by their defense of duress which 
made summary judgment inappropriate. 
Defendant Juanita Stillman contracted 
with plaintiff on May 12, 1978, to purchase 
certain land located in West Jordan, Utah. 
The purchase entailed plaintiff's acquisition 
of the subject land from one Rosella Woods 
by means of a land exchange. By the 
terms of the contract and escrow agree-
ment executed by the parties, the purchase 
was to l>e closed the same day by payment 
over to the escrow agent of the full pur-
EXHIBIT 
D-4 
HEGLAR RANCH, 
Cite as, Utah. 
chase price of $704,000 in return for deliv-
ery of a warranty deed to the property. 
There was a failure of performance on 
the part of defendant Juanita Stillman oc-
casioned by her inability to secure the funds 
with which to pay the purchase price, and 
the escrow was therefore terminated. A 
short time thereafter, defendant Juanita 
Stillman advised plaintiff of the further 
prospect of financing and of her desire to 
reinstate the agreement. On June 21, 1978, 
plaintiff, through legal counsel, informed 
defendants of its willingness to reinstate 
the prior agreement, conditioned upon the 
execution by both defendants of two prom-
issory notes in the amount of $25,000 each, 
one being the note that is the subject of this 
lawsuit, and the other payable to Rosella 
Woods. As a further condition of reinstate-
ment, in the event defendant Juanita Still-
man should again fail to .perform by June 
29, 1978, the agreement would again be 
terminated and the escrow documents, in-
cluding the promissory notes, would be de-
livered to plaintiff as stipulated damages. 
Defendants balked at the conditions im-
posed and sought to be relieved thereof by 
telephoning plaintiff's president, Mr. Max 
Gillette, who disclaimed any knowledge of 
the imposition of such conditions, but did 
agree to look into the matter. 
Defendants' additional efforts to contact 
Gillette failed, and on June 23, 1978, they 
appeared in the office of the escrow agent 
with their own legal counsel, at which time 
they executed the supplemental escrow 
agreement, including the promissory notes, 
although they did so under protest. 
Defendant Juanita Stillman again failed 
to pay over the purchase price, and this 
action on the note payable to plaintiff was 
instituted. Based on the pleadings, affida-
vits, depositions of the defendants, and oth-
er supporting documents, plaintiff's motion 
I. Including depositions, answers to interrogato-
ries, admissions, affidavits, etc. 
NC. v. STILLMAN Utah 1 3 9 1 
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for summary judgment was granted by the 
trial court. 
[1] Summary judgment is appropriate if 
the pleadings and all other submissions * 
show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving par-
ty is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.2 
[2] The foregoing rule does not preclude 
summary judgment simply whenever some 
fact remains in dispute, but only when a 
material fact is genuinely controverted.3 
[3] The rule regarding the avoidance of 
contractual obligations by reason of duress 
is as set forth in the case of Fox v. 
Picrcey:4 
. . . any wrongful act or threat which 
actually puts the victim in such fear as to 
compel him to act against his will consti-
tutes duress. 
Thus, to invalidate a contract, a party 
thereto must show (1) that the other con-
tracting party committed a wrongful act (2) 
which put the initial party in fear (3) such 
as to compel him to act against his will. 
(4] Viewed in light of the above re-
quirements, defendants* contention is whol-
ly without merit that a material issue of 
fact has been raised, the resolution of which 
could constitute the defense of duress. De-
fendants have simply failed to in any way 
demonstrate how it was wrongful for plain-
tiff to follow the advice of counsel and thus 
impose conditions upon the reinstatement 
of the agreements, so as to insure against 
further financial loss in the event of a 
second failure to perform the contract. 
Moreover, defendants were not placed in 
such fear as would deprive them of their 
free will-by defendant Juanita Stillman's 
own admission, had they chosen to walk 
away from the negotiations, the only conse-
3. Kesler v. Kesler, Utah. 583 P.2d 87 (1978). 
citing Disabled American Veterans v. Hendrix-
son, 9 Utah 2d 152. 340 P.2d 416 (!959). 
2. Rule 56(c). Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. 119 Utah 367. 227 P.2d 763 (1951). 
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tence thereof would have Iwen the loss of 
hatever benefits the deal might have af-
>rded them had it IK-en closed. To label as 
luress" such incentive to complete the 
-ansaction would have the effect of per-
su ing any party to avoid a contractual 
bligation on the ground that performance 
.'as agreed to only because, in the absence 
f such a promise, the party would be de-
lied the benefit of a bargain. Such a de-
ense is entirely foreign to the established 
aw of contracts. 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff. 
CROCKETT, C. J., WILKINS and 
STEWART, J J., and R. L. TUCKETT, 
Retired Justice. 
MA UGH AN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
